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Summary 
This thesis is devoted to examining the recently established human rights 
regime within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 
consisting of the ASEAN Charter, the ASEAN Intergovernmental 
Commission on Human Rights (AICHR), and the ASEAN Commission on 
the Promotion and Protection of Women and Children (ACWC). The 
overall purpose is study if the regime will ensure better adherence of human 
rights amongst Southeast Asian nations. Can this human rights regime have 
any effective impact on state behaviour? In an attempt to assess this issue, 
the thesis looks at: (1) the history and approaches to human rights in the 
Southeast Asian region with ASEAN as the framework for human rights 
cooperation; (2) international standards for human right regimes in general 
and how they can be assessed; (3) and, against this framework, the ASEAN 
Charter and the ToRs to the AICHR and ACWC. It is through the legalised 
and institutionalised framework of the Charter that the AICHR and ACWC 
will operate with more specific mandates provided in their respective 
Terms of Reference (ToRs). What institutional framework does the 
ASEAN Charter create and what potential measures can the commissions 
adopt to enhance the protection of human rights? The thesis concludes by 
examining and analyzing the main challenges at the initial stages and what 
steps the ASEAN human rights regime needs to take to engender a 
framework for human rights protection in the region. 
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Preface 
Human rights have always been a sensitive issue amongst the states in 
Southeast Asia and in large absent on the agenda of the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Thus, when the Member States in 2008 
through the ASEAN Charter committed themselves to create a “human 
rights body” which in 2009 emerged as the ASEAN Intergovernmental 
Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) it was considered to be somewhat 
a historic momentum and a possibility to pave the way for growth of 
democracy and human rights in the region. The emerging human rights 
framework was also bolstered by the establishment of the ASEAN 
Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Women and Children 
(ACWC) in 2010. However, with the adoption of the Terms of Reference 
(ToR) to the Commissions, it was clear that these two human rights bodies 
were going to focus primarily on the promotion of human rights rather than 
on protecting them. While it was a welcome sign that human rights were 
now a part of the ASEAN agenda, at the same time it was clear that the 
AICHR and the ACWC, being bodies within the ASEAN framework rather 
than being independent from the same, would also be permeated by the 
consensus-based, non interference approach that has become a well known 
corner stone in ASEAN decision making process, more formally known as 
the ‘ASEAN Way.’ ASEAN has always been a rather loose organisation 
based on soft institutions and informal agreements. While this approach 
arguably might have had effective implications in attaining the purposes of 
security and economic growth in the region, it is an ineffective approach 
when it comes to ensuring effective protection and implementation of 
human rights.  
 
This thesis examines the recently established ASEAN human rights regime, 
consisting of the ASEAN Charter, the AICHR and the ACWC, to see if it 
can have any effective impact on state behaviour when it comes to human 
rights. In order to assess the potential of the ASEAN human rights regime, 
premature as it may seem, the thesis scrutinizes the ASEAN Charter and the 
ToR’s to the AICHR and ACWC. It is through the institutionalised 
framework provided in the ASEAN Charter that these two commissions will 
operate with the specific mandates provided in each commissions ToR. 
What institutional framework does the ASEAN Charter create and what are 
the potential for the AICHR and the ACWC to engender a framework for 
human rights protection in the region?   
 
There is considerable information written on human rights instruments and 
enforcement in the three already existing regional regimes: the European, 
the Inter-American and the African. Since no regional human rights regime 
has existed in Southeast Asia, it is very interesting to study the one 
established by ASEAN in its initial stages. It is however important to 
emphasize here, due to the early phase of development and the many 
differences between the Southeast Asian region and other regions in the 
world, that a direct comparison between the ASEAN human rights regime 
vi 
 
and other regional human right regimes is not feasible or even possible to 
make. However, it is unenviable not to consider other regional regimes 
together with the global UN human rights system. Even though there are no 
concrete norms on how a regional human rights regime should be framed, 
the very purpose with regional approaches have always been to address 
human rights within the regional context in order to strengthen national 
protection and further supplement the UN system. At the same time, all 
trans-national regimes must be founded upon shared values, since 
international institutions reflect their creators’ willingness to adopt a 
cooperative approach to toward common concerns. Against such a 
framework, the essential challenge for ASEAN is to address human rights 
from the standpoint of ASEAN without letting the ASEAN human rights 
regime be reduced into something insignificant.  
 
Indeed, the new cooperative framework, formalised through the ASEAN 
Charter together with the recently established AICHR and ACWC, marks a 
step in the struggle to advance human rights in the region. Whether this step 
is a significant one and what implications it will have for ASEAN and its 
Member States is far from easy to predict at this early stage in development. 
While conclusions can only be speculative, it is hardly realistic or feasible to 
see that ASEAN will in the nearest construct a system of intervening in one 
another’s affairs on the grounds of violations of human rights. Rather, what 
the AICHR and the ACWC can do is focus on specific human concerns that 
all can share, or at least no one can publicly reject, like the protection of 
minorities, women and children. Such developments have already been 
visible. The thesis further recognises that there are three key stakeholders 
involved in the process for the human rights regime to further develop and 
function well: the Member States of ASEAN; ASEAN itself through the 
Commissions; civil society, mainly through various human rights 
organisations and national human rights institutions (NHRIs).  
 
Much of the research was conducted during a field trip to Thailand between 
September and December 2010 funded by a Minor Field Study scholarship 
from the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA). 
During this period, I met and interviewed various stakeholders with 
experience from working with human rights in the region. Thailand’s 
representative on the AICHR pointed out to me, a sense of scepticism 
permeating her tone, that conducting interviews with stakeholders only in 
Thailand will not be representative for the entire region. To make things 
clear, the intentions with this thesis however is not to give a representative 
view on the standpoint on human rights and the new human rights regime 
from stakeholders in all ten ASEAN nations. The purpose is rather to 
speculate from the standpoint of what the nations have produced- the 
ASEAN Charter, the commissions and their ToRs- to see what potential 
changes they can bring about. In that sense, the interviews has been a source 
of inspiration and reality check in support of some of the ideas put forward 
in this paper. The interviews are however not in any way by themselves 
meant to serve as a basis on which any factual conclusions can be 
substantiated. 
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Since most of the research and writing of this thesis was done between 
October 2010 and January 2011, subsequent developments with regards to 
the ASEAN human rights regime have not been covered. 
 
Lastly, I would like to thank my supervisor Dr. Karol Nowak for his 
support. I am also grateful to all the persons who took some of their 
valuable time to take part in an interview and provided me with valuable 
inputs.  
 
 
 
 
Stockholm, June 2011 
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CHAPTER I 
1. Introduction: The Birth of a New Regional Human 
Rights Regime  
1.2 BACKGROUND 
This thesis is devoted to examining the effectiveness of the recently 
established human rights regime within the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN).1 In Southeast Asia and elsewhere, the national 
framework remains the number one factor for the promotion and protection 
of human rights. Today, the systems consist of a variety of mechanisms, 
such as the national court systems, national human rights institution 
(NHRIs) and ombudsmen. Yet, many times the national systems have 
proven insufficient especially if they are unable or unwilling to monitor, act 
and offer redress to individuals in case of violations. There is thus a need for 
regional arrangements to overcome or prevent lacunae and further enhance 
promotion and protection of human rights.2 Regional human right regimes 
have proven to be more effective and useful in promoting and protecting 
human rights than the United Nations global human rights regime because 
they cannot only be complementary to the UN system but also operate in the 
regional context, reflecting regional particularities.3 While regional human 
right regimes have been in operation for some time in Europe, the Americas, 
and Africa, in Southeast Asia such a regime has been absent. Southeast Asia 
is one of the world's most ethnically, politically and religious diverse and 
complex regions. It is a region where many human rights violations have 
been reported to occur.4 With almost 600 million citizens, Southeast Asia 
has been one of the last regions in the world, with a regional cooperation 
embodied in ASEAN, which at the same time clearly lacked a unifying legal 
framework as well as a human rights regime.   
 
The term ‘ambivalence’ has been used to best describe the physiognomy of 
human rights in Southeast Asia,5 and the absence of human rights 
                                               
1
 The term ‘human rights regime’ is taken from Jack Donnelly who defines an international 
regime as: “a set of principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures accepted by 
states (and other actors) as binding within an issue area” Jack Donnelly, International 
Human Rights (3rd ed) (Westview Press 2007) p. 79. Other terms that commonly appear, 
and are sometimes used interchangeably, even throughout this work, are human right 
bodies, human rights mechanisms and human rights systems.  
2
 Vitit Muntarbhorn ‘Human Rights Monitoring in the Asia-Pacific Region’ in Gudmundur 
Alfredsson (et. al) (eds.) International Human Rights Monitoring Mechanisms: Essays in 
Honour of Jakob Th. Möller (2nd ed.) (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2009) p. 641. 
3
 Weston, Lukes and Hnatt, ‘Regional Human Rights Regimes: A Comparison and 
Appraisal’ Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law (Volume 20, No 4 1987) pp. 589-590. 
4
 See for example the Asia Pacific Forum webpage Available at:  
<http://www.asiapacificforum.net/issues> (Accessed on May 17, 2010) 
5
 Vitit Muntarbhorn,  Dimensions of Human Rights in Asia Pacific, Office of the National 
Human Rights Commission in Thailand, Bangkok, (2002) p. 56. See also Li-ann Thio, 
‘Implementing Human Rights in ASEAN Countries: Promises to Keep and Miles to Go 
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cooperation at the regional level may be explained due to a number of 
factors. First, the region has been considered too large and heterogeneous to 
have such cooperation or formulate a common stance on human rights, and 
any attempt to examine the human rights situation in the ASEAN region and 
the prospects for human rights regime must take into account the political 
culture of the region. The Member States to ASEAN speak for themselves 
on this account. They range from democratic countries to dictatorships, 
from relatively developed countries to underdeveloped countries, from 
countries with a fairly openness to human rights to countries with a denial to 
many aspects of human rights.6 Second, human rights have always been 
conceived as a threat to the sovereignty of the state and therefore considered 
a domestic issue and concern. According to many Southeast Asian states, no 
one can dictate and make judgements on others about human rights, and the 
international community has no right to intervene.7 Third, the relationship 
between human rights, democracy and economic development have played a 
crucial role in that many states believe that individual rights must give way 
to the demands of national security and economic growth.8 Finally, cultural 
relativism, embodied in the notion of ‘Asian values’ has often been used as 
an argument to dismiss the western concept of democracy and human rights 
as not suitable for the Southeast Asian context.9  
 
The prospects for developing a human rights regime within the ASEAN 
framework has been the subject of a number of studies,10  all of which have 
highlighted the difficulties of pushing human rights cooperation within 
ASEAN. The first reason for this, as highlighted above, is the diversity of 
Member States and their ambivalence towards human rights. The second 
reason has been the architecture of ASEAN itself. ASEAN has been a rather 
loosely structured organisation mainly focused on economic development 
and political security. This, together with the core norms of consensus based 
decision-making and non-interference in the internal affairs of Member 
States, more formally known as the ASEAN Way, has made the prospects 
                                                                                                                        
Before I Sleep’ in Dinah L. Shelton Regional Protection of Human Rights (Oxford 
University Press 2008) p. 1067. First published in Yale Human Rights and Development 
Journal 2, no 1. (1999). And Maznah Mohammad ‘Towards a Human Rights Regime in 
Southeast Asia’ Contemporary Southeast Asia Volume 24, Number 2 (2002) p. 230.  
6
 Heu Yee Leung, ‘ASEAN and Human Rights: The prospects of implementing a regional 
mechanism for the promotion and protection of human rights in Southeast Asia’ p. 9-10 
Available at: <http://www.lawanddevelopment.org/articles/seapaper.html> (Accessed on 
May 17, 2011). 
7
 Mely Caballero-Anthony ‘Human Rights, Economic Change and Political Development’ 
in James T.H. Tang (ed.) Human Rights and International Relations in the Asia Pacific 
(Pinter, London 1995) pp. 47-48. 
8
 Yash Gai ‘Asian Perspectives on Human Rights’ in James T.H. Tang, ibid,  pp. 58-60. 
9
 Diane K. Mauzy, ‘The human rights and 'Asian values' debate in Southeast Asia: Trying 
to clarify the key issues.’ The Pacific Review  (Volume 10, No 2, 1997) pp. 210-236. See 
also Close & Askew, Asia Pacific and Human Rights: A Global Political Economy 
Perspective (Ashgate Publishing Limited 2004) p. 12. 
10
 See for example Hidetoshi Hashimoto, The prospects for a Regional Human Rights 
Mechanism in East Asia (Routledge, New York, 2004), Li-ann Thio, supra note 5; Maznah 
Mohammad, supra note 5;  and Heu Yee Leung supra note 6. 
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for more firm cooperation highly doubtful.11 Of course, ASEAN is merely a 
reflection of the Member States’ degree of willingness to cooperate with 
each other. The few legally binding agreements reached by this 
organisation, non in the field of human rights, also shows the states’ 
reluctance to vest power into more firm cooperation. Human rights by their 
very nature require legally binding treaties and political will to enforce those 
treaties and sanction by states against states when failing to do so. While a 
regional human rights regime within ASEAN has been considered possible, 
it is at the same time no surprise that the conclusions reached by previous 
studies argues that such a regime would merely focus on promotion of 
human rights rather than of protection and enforcement mechanisms. In that 
way governments can participate without fear of sacrificing their sovereign 
rights.12 
 
For several decades, there have been initiatives, both through the UN, 
different human right workshops, and even ASEAN itself, for establishing a 
regional arrangement and cooperation to protect human rights in the 
region.13  The more concrete impetus for developing a regional human 
rights regime within ASEAN was however initially provided by the 1993 
World Conference on Human Rights where ASEAN states endorsed the 
Vienna Declaration and the Vienna Programme of Action, which reiterated 
that there is “the need to consider the possibility of establishing regional and 
sub-regional arrangements for the promotion and protection of human rights 
where they do not already exist”.14 At the 26th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, 
held in Singapore, a joint Communiqué was issued, which declared that the 
ASEAN, in support of the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action 
“should also consider the establishment of an appropriate regional 
mechanism on human rights”.15 The development has since then been a 
slow and on-going process with several landmarks featuring the push and 
pull factor which finally led to the establishment of the new ASEAN human 
                                               
11
 Hao Duy Phan, ‘The ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights and 
Beyond’ Asia Pacific Bulletin Number 40, July 20, 2009. While ASEAN is far from the 
only organization upholding the principle of non-interference, the principle is interpreted 
and applied quite rigidly, especially when it comes to human rights. This is one of the 
major reasons why pushing human rights under ASEAN has been a very difficult process. 
12
 Hidetoshi Hashimoto, supra note 10, p. 144; Li-ann Thio, supra note 5, p. 1067. 
13
 For instance, in the middle of the 1980s, the UN General Assembly began to pass 
resolutions more specifically on the Asia-Pacific region. Resolution 41/153 titled Regional 
Arrangements for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights in the Asian and Pacific 
Region is an example and called upon states from the region to respond to the call for 
“regional arrangements”. (UN Doc. A/RES/41/153, 4 December 1986) 
14
 1993 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, adopted at the World Conference on 
Human Rights, Vienna, 14-25 June, 1993, Article 37. Available at: 
<http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/(symbol)/a.conf.157.23.en> (Accessed on 
May 20, 2011). See also  Vitit Muntarbhorn ‘A Roadmap for an ASEAN Human Rights 
Mechanism’ Available at: <http://www.fnf.org.ph/liberallibrary/roadmap-for-asean-human-
rights.htm> (Accessed on May 17, 2011) 
15
 Quoted in Yuyun Wahyuningrum ‘ASEAN’s Road Map Towards Creating a Human 
Rights Regime in Southeast Asia’ in Human Rights Milestones: Challenges and 
Developments in Asia (Forum Asia, Bangkok, 2009), p. 71. 
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rights regime.16 In this process, civil society organisations (CSOs) have 
played an important role providing many of the initiatives to explore 
possible mechanisms, most notably the Working Group for an ASEAN 
Human Rights Mechanism.17 The regime may thus not come as a total 
surprise, but is the fruits of persistent engagement between civil society and 
ASEAN.18   
 
1.1.1. The ASEAN Human Rights Regime and Early Implications 
 
Much of the above described criticism directed towards ASEAN and its 
Member States on the issue of regional human rights cooperation has in 
large has remained unanswered, or been met with a variation of the same old 
arguments. The ASEAN Working Group captured one of the essential 
concerns by stating that “the lack of an ASEAN mechanism implies that 
while the region is exposed to monitoring from sources outside the region, 
there are few opportunities for the region to take stock of human rights 
developments in the region from the standpoint of ASEAN”19 This display 
that one of the most central concerns for ASEAN in creating a human rights 
regime has been to address human rights from within, without letting 
external pressure shape their framework too much. Essentially, the response 
from ASEAN and its Member States towards the critique on human rights 
now lies in the recently established human rights regime.  
 
The current ASEAN human rights regime consists of the ASEAN Charter,20 
the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) 
with its mandates provided in the Terms of Reference (ToR)21, and the 
ASEAN Commission on the Protection of Women and Children (ACWC) 
and its ToR.22 The ASEAN Charter, which entered into force in 2008 serves 
as the Associations constitution and provides it with a legal personality 
under international law, turning it into a more rule-based organisation. The 
ASEAN Charter, setting out to be more peoples oriented, also reinforced the 
Member States commitment to the promotion and protection of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms, introducing it both in its purposes and 
                                               
16
 For a comprehensive background to the creation of the ASEAN human rights regime, see 
Hao Duy Phan, ‘The Evolution Towards an ASEAN Human Rights Body’ Asia-Pacific 
Journal of Human Rights and the Law, Volume 9, Issue  1 (2008), pp. 1-12. See also 
Yuyun Wahyuningrum, supra note 15. 
17
 Vitit Muntarbhorn, supra note 2, p. 646.  
18
 Sriprapha Petcharamesree ‘The Human rights Body: A Test for Democracy Building in 
ASEAN’ (International IDEA, 2009) p. 9. 
19
 Working Group for an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism, quoted in Close & Askew, 
supra note 9, p. 113. 
20
 ASEAN Charter, Signed on November 20, 2007 Available at:  
<http://www.aseansec.org/21861.htm> (Accessed on May 17, 2011) See Article 2 (i). 
21
 Terms of Reference of ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights, 
Available at:  
<http://www.aseansec.org/22769.htm> (Accessed on 17 May, 2011). 
22
 Terms of Reference of the ASEAN Commission for the Promotion and Protection of 
the Rights of Women and Children (ACWC) Available at:  
<http://www.aseansec.org/documents/TOR-ACWC.pdf> (Accessed on May 17, 2011). 
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principles.23 The ASEAN Charter Article 14 also provides the mandate to 
establish a “human rights body”. 
 
In 2009, the AICHR was inaugurated. Mandated through the ASEAN 
Charter, the AICHR was born out of the ASEAN Political-Security 
Community. The Political-Security Community, together with ASEAN’s 
economic and socio-cultural communities, will form the foundation of an 
ASEAN Community, which is set to be established by 2015. ASEAN’s 
emerging human rights framework was also bolstered by the establishment 
of the ACWC in 2010. This commission however is mandated not through 
the Charter, but established under the Socio-Cultural Community blueprint, 
which is not a legally binding document.24 The Terms of Reference (ToR) 
establishes the purposes, principles and mandates of these two commissions. 
The ToRs sets out to mutually promote and protect human rights in the 
community building process of ASEAN.   
 
While the recent developments now provides an unprecedented possibility 
and platform to include human rights on the ASEAN agenda, the 
implications of the ASEAN human rights regime are many and a few main 
questions can be raised with regards to the functions and effectiveness of 
this new regime. First, the ambivalence towards human rights captured by 
the ASEAN Way of decision-making has been reproduced in the ambiguous 
language of the ASEAN Charter as well as the ToRs. A striking example is 
Article 14 of the Charter, which merely provides for “a human rights body” 
to be established without any further precision as to the features of this 
body. It shows that the states did not want to further precise the nature of 
this body in the Charter, running the risk of undertaking obligations to 
which they were not ready to commit. The absence of a dispute settlement 
mechanism within ASEAN against states who violates the Charter also 
display the consensus based approach as the core norm of ASEAN decision 
making and imply that Member States with the lowest human rights 
standards can use their veto to set the bar for human rights cooperation.  
 
Second, the broad and weak mandates of the ToRs make it clear that the 
ASEAN human rights regime will be mainly focused on promoting human 
rights rather than protecting them. This might not come as a surprise 
considering ASEAN’s history. The most obvious fallacy in this regard is the 
absence of a complaint and remedy mechanism for individuals. At the same 
time, it is unclear what some of these mandates actually imply. What does a 
mandate such as “develop strategies for the promotion and protection of 
human rights” (emphasis added) entail?25 This raises questions about the 
possibilities of the ASEAN human rights regime, its overall effectiveness, 
and whether it will live up to international human rights standards. Will the 
ASEAN human rights regime be complementary, bringing something in 
                                               
23
 ASEAN Charter, Articles 1.7 and 2(i). 
24
 ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community Blueprint, Section C.1, Article 27. Available at: 
<http://www.aseansec.org/5187-19.pdf> (Accessed on May 17, 2011).  
25
 AICHR ToR Article 4.1. 
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addition to the UN human rights regime, bearing in mind the strong notion 
of sovereignty and territorial integrity in these countries? 
 
Third, any sort of effective mechanism for the protection of human rights 
requires independence. It is crucial that the representatives that sit on the 
commissions serve in their personal capacity independent from their 
governments. While the ToRs to the AICHR and ACWC provide that each 
representative shall act impartially, they also provide that the representatives 
are accountable to their respective governments who may, at their own 
discretion, replace their representative.26 This raises the question whether 
the regime can promote and protect human rights, both in terms of the rather 
weak mandates, but also in terms of how the representatives will be able to 
interpret, use and enforce those mandates.  
 
Finally, any type of human rights regime needs involvement of civil society 
organisations (CSOs) to ensure its independence and provide checks and 
balances. If ASEAN wants to transform itself from a state centric entity to a 
more peoples based organisation, it must open up and expand its dialogue 
with civil society. When it comes to the commissions in particular, the lack 
of engagement has been visible since only two of the commissioners, those 
from Indonesia and Thailand, have been appointed with an open and 
inclusive selection process, whereas in the rest of the Member States the 
selection was exclusively done by government officials.  
 
The above undeniably open up room for criticism. Early comments made 
with regards to the ASEAN human rights regime also shared one overall 
common feature, as ASEAN Secretary General Surin Pitsuwan noted- that 
is, “a sense of reservation”; a doubt to whether ASEAN actually intends to 
implement the ASEAN Charter and if human rights truly has emerged as an 
important concern for ASEAN and its Member States.27  
 
Such scepticism seems justified bearing in mind the history and approach to 
human rights by many of the states in the region. Realistically, we may ask 
ourselves; “what other mechanism is possible at this stage?”28 Establishing 
an effective human rights regime undoubtedly takes time and will not 
happen overnight, certainly not in Southeast Asia. At the same time, the 
central question and concern remain, “whether the commission will be 
robust and do what it can, or whether it will end up becoming a servant of 
regimes that are very unfriendly to human rights”.29 Clearly, even a weak 
human rights regime may contribute, in a way acceptable to states, to 
                                               
26
 See AICHR ToR Chapter 5, and ACWC ToR Chapter 6.  
27
 Surin Pitsuwan  made this comment during his opening speech at ‘the 1st International 
conference on human rights in southeast Asia’, organized by the Southeast Asian Human 
Rights Studies Network (SEAHRN), October 14-15, 2010 , Bangkok, Thailand. For more 
information see SEAHRN website, available at: <http://www.seahrn.org/> (Accessed on 
May 19, 2011). 
28
 Interview with Dr. Festo Kavishe, Deputy Regional Director, UNICEF, Bangkok, 
Thailand. 
29
 Interview with Ms. Erin Shaw, Regional Legal Advisor, Asia-Pacific Programme, 
International Commission of Jurists, Bangkok, Thailand. 
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improve national practice.30 However, if the regime is too weak, it may lack 
so much in credibility that it becomes an obstacle for any subsequent 
credible human rights cooperation. Therefore, the initial steps of the 
ASEAN human rights regime will give a hint of how much the Member 
States are committed to improve human rights or whether it is set up to fail.  
 
1.1.2. Purpose and Focus of the Thesis 
 
The overall purpose of this thesis is to examine the implications of the 
recently established human rights regime within ASEAN. More clearly, the 
effort is to study if the regime will ensure better adherence of human rights 
amongst Southeast Asian nations. Can this human rights regime have any 
effective impact on state behaviour?  
 
In an attempt to assess the ASEAN human rights regime the thesis 
examines: (1) the history and approaches to human rights in the region with 
ASEAN as the framework for human rights cooperation; (2) international 
standards for human right regimes in general and how they can be assessed; 
(3) and, against this framework, the ASEAN human right regime, 
consisting of the ASEAN Charter and the ToR’s to the AICHR and ACWC. 
It is through the legalised and institutionalised framework of the Charter 
that the AICHR and ACWC will operate with more specific mandates 
provided in their respective ToR. What measures can these commissions 
adopt to improve the protection and promotion of human rights and what 
are the main challenges at the initial stages? 
 
The thesis further recognizes that there are three key stakeholders for the 
subsequent development and effective implementation of the ASEAN 
human rights regime. First, and most important, it requires the political will 
of the Member States to ASEAN from above. If we consider human rights 
enforcement and protection, it is clear that effective implementation 
ultimately rests within the framework of the national state. For this to 
happen, political will is needed.  Second, it requires the initiative of the 
representatives to the commissions from within. The commissioners must 
be independent and take initiatives to use the mandates wisely in order for 
the regime to be effective. Third, it requires the engagement of civil society, 
mainly through human rights organisations and national human rights 
institutions (NHRIs), from below. Civil society ultimately provides the 
checks and balances ensuring that the work of the commissions is 
effective.31 
 
                                               
30
 See Chapter 4 on human right regimes and Jack Donnelly, supra note 1,  pp. 105-106. 
31
 Homayoun Alizadeh ‘ASEAN and Human Rights: Closing the Implementation Gap’ 
OHCHR Regional Office for South-East Asia (22 October 2009) Available at: 
<http://bangkok.ohchr.org/programme/asean/asean-human-rights-closing-implementation-
gap.aspx> (Accessed on May 18, 2011). 
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1.1.3. The Quest to Measure Effectiveness - Methodological 
Concerns 
 
Some general remarks need to be made about the effectiveness of regional 
human right regimes and effective implementation of human rights to 
further explain the methodological framework chosen for this thesis. What 
is meant by effectiveness, and how does one measure the effectiveness of a 
regional human rights body and what criterions can be used? 
 
In general, effectiveness is a complex issue and difficult to assess, and the 
study of regime effectiveness lacks a common precisely defined core.32 
Evaluation of the effective protection of human rights in any regime or at 
any level varies given different assumptions and definitions of what 
constitutes effective protection. This is compounded by the difficult issue of 
causality, meaning the problem of identifying whether it was the subject of 
study, other factors, or a combination of both that contributed to enhance 
human rights protection and implementation. However, any regime is 
conventionally defined as a set of norms, rules and regulations and all 
research on the effectiveness of a regime has to try to determine how and to 
what extent this body of norms and rules can influence the behaviour of the 
parties to the regime.33 When assessing effectiveness of any institution or 
regime, Underdal and Young (2004) holds that: “Any attempt to develop 
some kind of methodological framework must at least address three 
fundamental questions.” First, what is the object to be addressed? Second, 
against which standards is this object to be evaluated? Third, how do we 
compare the object to the standards we have defined?34  When examining 
effectiveness it can be seen as sub-field of the broader study what 
consequences a regime will have. The notion of regime strengths in turn 
focuses on the properties of the regime itself rather than on the 
consequences it produces. Of course, strengths as properties are of 
considerable interest within themselves because strengths are essential to 
enhance effectiveness.35 In that sense one can pin point certain strengths and 
weaknesses of a human rights regime to conclude how effective it will be 
and what needs to be improved.  
 
When it comes to human rights in particular, the quest for effectiveness lies 
at the heart of every human rights system. Using the European system as an 
example, the preamble to the European Convention on Human Rights 
explicitly demonstrates this by stating that the Convention: “aims at 
securing effective recognition and observance” (emphasis added) of the 
rights set forth in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights.36  It is clear 
                                               
32
 Arild  Underdal and Oran R. Young (Eds.): Regime Consequences – Methodological 
Challenges and Research Strategies. (Kluwer Academic Publishers 2004) p. 27. 
33
 Ibid, p. 32. 
34
 Ibid, p. 31. 
35
 Ibid, p. 32. 
36
 Preamble to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, Available at:  
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that the European Convention on Human Rights sets out to protect real and 
substantive rights, not just rhetorical ones. Case law from the European 
Court of Human Rights has shown that the Court has progressively 
established that the Convention is not a static but a living instrument37 
designed to” guarantee not rights that are theoretical or illusory but rights 
that are practical and effective”. 38 In doing so its contents must be read to 
secure effective rights protection for individuals as European societies 
evolves.39  
 
Obstacles to ensure effectiveness can in very broad terms be divided into 
two main categories - fundamental and structural ambiguities within the 
regime. Fundamental obstacles to ensure effective protection of human 
rights in any human rights regime are constituted mainly by resistance from 
states.40 This is because human rights are ultimately a national issue. States 
are the principal violators of human rights and the principal actors governed 
by the regime’s norms. Donnelly (2007) observes that national commitment 
is the single most important factor to a strong human rights regime, and it is 
often held that it is “political will” that underlines most strong regimes.41 
Similar, Keller and Sweet (2008) underlines that the European Court of 
Human Rights cannot on its own give agency to its jurisprudence in national 
legal orders. For a human rights regime to make a difference domestically, 
officials have to take decisions to strengthen its effectiveness.42 Thus, the 
effectiveness of the norms of an international human rights regime does not 
mainly depend on refined provisions or an excessive amount of case law, 
but the reception and implementation of these norms and decisions in the 
domestic legal order with regards to the particular characteristics of the 
contracting states.43 In order to enable the individual to enjoy his or her 
rights, these rights must be effectively protected by domestic legal and 
justice systems with appropriate implementation and enforcement 
procedures.44  
 
                                                                                                                        
< http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/005.htm> (Accessed on, May 18, 
2011). 
37
 Tyrer v. United Kingdom (appl. no. 5856/72) Judgement (Chamber) 25 April, 1978, para. 
31. 
38
 See for example Öcalan v. Turkey (appl. no. 46221/99) Judgement (Grand Chamber) 12 
May, 2005, para. 135. 
39
 The Court requires national authorities to interpret Convention rights so as to make them 
effective for individuals. Soering v. United Kingdom  (appl. no. 14038/88) Judgement 
(Chamber) 7 July 1989. 
40
 Mireille Delmas-Marty, The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights: 
International Protection versus National Restrictions. (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1992) 
pp. 101-103. 
41
 Jack Donnelly, supra note 1,  p. 105. 
42
 Hellen Keller and Alec Stone Sweet (eds.) A Europe of Rights – The Impact of th ECHR 
on national legal systems (Oxford University Press, 2008)  p. 8. 
43
 Francois Tulkens in Mireille Delmas-Marty, supra note 40, p. 106.  
44
 The principle of the rule of law is for example considered crucial and can also be 
described as an overarching principle in the field of human rights protection because, where 
it does not exist, effective implementation and respect for human rights becomes theoretical 
and illusory. 
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Structural ambiguities on the other hand entails that a regime has structural 
weaknesses. These can be of many different kinds. An example is the case 
overload and time span to render decisions in the European Court of Human 
Rights. 
 
In attempt to assess effectiveness of regional human rights regimes, some 
previous studies have taken different approaches. Weston Lukes and Hnatt 
(1987) for example examine two factors when measuring the effectiveness 
of the three already existing regional human rights regimes. The first is from 
the standpoint of accessibility of each regime for individual petitions. The 
second is from the standpoint of admissibility of human rights cases.45 J.-F. 
Perrin (1992) on the other hand considers that if the objective with a rule is 
compared with the degree to which it is achieved, this provides a measure of 
efficiency.46 The impact of a human rights convention in national legal 
orders can thus for example be measured by studying how different 
provisions such the right to a fair trial or freedom of speech have been 
implemented at state level. Keller and Sweet (2008) perhaps provide the 
most recent and comprehensive study.47 While recognizing that no well 
specified theory to assess the impact of ECHR exists, they attempt to study 
the impact of the ECHR on national legal systems by looking at different 
mechanisms titled reception - that is how national officials in governments, 
legislature and judiciaries have chosen to incorporate the ECHR into 
domestic law and what mechanisms they have developed to adopt the 
national systems to the ECHR as it evolves.48  The ECHR can be said to be 
effective, domestically, to the extent that national officials recognize, 
enforce, and give full effect to Convention rights and the interpretive 
authority of the Court, in their decisions.  
 
Given the above, it is important to be realistic what this thesis can and 
cannot do. It is no more than reasonable to conclude other than that it would 
be all but impossible to model the ASEAN human rights regime impact on 
ASEAN States in any scientifically approved and parsimonious way. The 
reasons are obvious. First, and most importantly, is that the ASEAN human 
rights regime is very new. It is too soon to talk about any real 
accomplishments to assess the effectiveness (other than the establishment of 
the regime is an accomplishment in itself since human rights are now on the 
ASEAN agenda and a subject for discussion in states that previously 
resented them). Second, there is currently no framework or tool that would 
actually systematically assess the respective degree of existing political will 
for human rights implementation or, more importantly, to track changes in 
this. Third, since the commissions are not open to individual petitions, 
arguably a huge shortcoming in itself, this measurement method is not 
possible. Fourth, there is no regional “ASEAN human rights instrument” 
against which impact at the national level may be studied. Finally, given 
that the commissions 2010-2015 Work Plan has not yet been circulated 
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 Weston, Lukes and Hnatt, supra note 3, p. 614. 
46
 Francois Tulkens in Mireille Delmas-Marty, supra note 40, p. 106. 
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publicly and no Rules of Procedure are formalised yet it seems premature to 
draw any more firm conclusions.  
 
On the other hand, the content of the ASEAN Charter and the ToRs to the 
AICHR and ACWC can provide us with initial insight to assess the ASEAN 
human rights regime. In this sense, one can pin point some strength and 
weaknesses with the regime and also make conclusions of the main 
challenges. Of course, other regional human right regimes are of 
considerable interest. A strict comparison is however unfair and unfeasible 
at this point because of the tender age of the ASEAN human right regime 
and the contextual framework against which it is created varies a lot from 
other regions and their regional human right regimes. However, since all 
human right regimes should not go below international human rights 
standards and also complement the global UN human rights regime, some 
general principles on what regional regimes ought to be able to do will still 
be considered to evaluate the ASEAN human rights regime.  
 
1.1.4. Disposition 
 
Besides this chapter, the thesis is divided into six chapters. Chapter two 
gives an overview of human rights perception in Southeast Asia and the 
reasons for the long-term absence of a regional human rights regime. 
Chapter three gives a background on ASEAN, its core norms and how this 
regional has dealt with human rights in the past. Chapter four examines the 
UN normative framework for establishing regional human right regimes. 
The chapter briefly lays out some of the main functions a regional human 
rights regime should be able to perform and how we can assess human right 
regimes. Chapter five turns to examine the fundamentals of the ASEAN 
human rights regime, the ASEAN Charter, the AICHR and its ToR and the 
ACWC and its ToR. What are the legal implications of the Charter when it 
comes to human rights and what functions and mandates do these 
commissions have? Chapter six looks closer at a few specific mandates and 
analyse how they open up for potentially stronger promotion and protection 
of human rights. Finally, chapter seven considers some of the main 
challenges and gives a few recommendations on the way forward together 
with some general conclusions. 
 
1.2. METHODOLOGY 
1.2.1. Research Material 
 
This thesis has been researched using a qualitative method.49 Albeit there is 
no single standardized qualitative method, a qualitative approach in general 
allows more flexibility and deeper insight and analysis of the material, the 
                                               
49
 For a more comprehensive explanation of what a qualitative method is, see Peter 
Esaiasson, Metodpraktikan: konsten att studera samhälle individ och marknad (Norsteds 
juridik 2007) chapters 11-12.  
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main aim for this thesis is to better understand how the ASEAN human 
rights regime is set up and will operate in the ASEAN context. The material 
has been collected in two different ways. The first might be thought of as 
more traditional where material have been collected from literature, articles 
and documents for background research and background parts for the essay. 
Information about ASEAN and human rights has of course been of high 
relevance, but also information about regional human rights systems in 
general and how we can measure human rights effectiveness and 
performance. Most of the literature have been collected from the RWI 
Library and the Asia Library (Centre for East and South-East Asian Studies) 
at Lund University. There is a vast amount of literature about ASEAN, but 
most literature is focused on the more historical and political aspects of the 
Association. Material on ASEAN and its institutions from a legal 
perspective is in general very scarce. A few books bring the human rights, 
but very few, if any, deal with the normative framework created by the 
ASEAN human rights regime from a legal aspect. Furthermore, articles and 
documents have been collected from various internet sources. Moreover, 
relevant articles in primary sources such as the ASEAN Charter, the ToRs 
as well as the 1967 Bangkok Declaration have been closely examined and 
analysed.  
 
1.2.2. Minor Field Study 
 
The second method is a Minor Field Study (MFS) funded by a scholarship 
from the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA). 
The study was conducted in Thailand between September and December 
2010. While part of the time during this study was used to collect more 
written material about ASEAN and human rights, the focus however, was to 
conduct interviews with relevant stakeholders concerning the ASEAN 
human rights regime. It is very important to underline here that the purpose 
with the study and the interviews as such, has been to provide the author 
with inspiration and inputs as a reality check to write this thesis. Together 
with written sources and legal documents, the interviews have been used to 
highlight some problems and underline some arguments. The interviews are 
however not in any way by themselves meant to serve as a basis on which 
any factual conclusions can be substantiated. 
 
1.2.3. Interviews 
 
The purpose with the interviews has been to explore the views of different 
actors regarding the ASEAN human rights regime and its prospects in the 
ASEAN context, whether it can be independent and effective as a human 
rights mechanism and whether it meets their expectations. There are two 
main reasons for an expert based study. First, due to the lack of time and 
resources any large-scale investigation would be impossible and maybe not 
even desirable for this kind of thesis. The purpose with qualitative 
interviews as opposed to a more quantitative research approach (where for 
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example a questionnaire could have been sent out) is to get more in-depth 
with a lower number of relevant respondents to explore their view on the 
subject in order to have relevant information to assess the questions asked in 
this thesis.  Second, expert participants will be more closely engaged in 
human rights work and know how it is protected on the national and 
regional levels. They will also be familiar with the social, cultural and 
economical conditions in the region as well as the major human right 
themes.  
 
1.2.4. Interview Method 
 
The interviews were based on a few questions as a point of departure. The 
stakeholders were informed beforehand of the overall purpose with the 
interview, but not in detail about the specific contents of the questions. This 
was to ensure that the answers given were more spontaneous, openhearted 
and truthful, reflecting the stakeholder’s individual opinion rather than 
giving a rehearsed answer that might reflect a more official standpoint.  The 
interviews were conducted on a semi-standardized basis and therefore 
progressed differently with different questions depending on the answers 
given. All interviews however covered the same main aspects.  
 
1.2.5. Respondents 
 
Respondents were selected based on mainly two criteria: First, that they had 
knowledge and experience with regard to human rights issues in Southeast 
Asia and could give substantive opinions on AICHR. Second, that they, 
given the geographical limitations, were able to meet in person.   
 
The list of possible participants was created from various sources. Some 
were chosen because of their writings on the subject in books or articles. 
Many names of individuals and organisations have also been found by 
looking at protocols from workshops on a human rights mechanism for 
ASEAN. The Working Group for an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism 
has for example organised conferences, roundtable discussions and 
workshops annually where people representing governments, NHRIs, 
NGOs, ASEAN and the UN participated. Some of the stakeholders 
interviewed for this thesis also took part in the First International 
Conference on Human Rights in Southeast Asia, organized in Bangkok on 
October 14-15, 2010. During this conference, several presentations were 
also given on related topics. This material has also been used as an 
inspiration for this thesis. 
 
1.2.6. Interview Delimitations 
 
Due to the lack of time and resources the Minor Field Study has obvious 
limitations. One limitation is of course that it would be impossible to 
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conduct interviews with all relevant stakeholders in the region. In the end, 
the interviews were dependent on the willingness and possibility of these 
individuals to participate. Another limitation is the lack of participants from 
various sectors. My initial hope was to conduct interviews with stakeholders 
from different sectors of society in order to provide as broad and nuanced 
view of the ASEAN human rights regime as possible. However, due to the 
reluctance from some stakeholders the main inputs were provided by 
representatives from NGOs working with human rights. Lastly, and as 
pointed out above, the entire study and the interviews have been meant to 
serve foremost as inspiration and not as a basis for any factual conclusions. 
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CHAPTER II 
2. Human Rights in Southeast Asia: In Search for a 
Regional Standard 
This chapter gives a brief overview of the history and traditions, 
development and application of human rights in Southeast Asia with focus 
on the ten countries comprising ASEAN.50 Some facts and figures are used 
to illustrate the current situation. The regions diversity together with the 
nexus between democracy, human rights and economic development is 
central to understand the discourse of human rights in this region. So is the 
‘Asian value’ concept that has been used to dismiss the Western concept of 
human rights and that closely interrelates with the Southeast Asian states 
approaches to democracy and economic development. Although the term 
Asian values is not invoked to the same extent these days, concerns about 
different values and other circumstances continue to surface ongoing 
discussion about human rights. Within this discourse, ASEAN has been 
standing out as the potential framework where regional human rights 
cooperation could take place. Given the diversity in Southeast Asia, the 
important question is whether there is some consistency and unity in the 
policies and articulation of the states when it comes to human rights?  
 
2.1. PROSPECTS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS COOPERATION AND 
THE LACK OF A REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS REGIME 
2.1.1. Assessment of the Human Rights Situation in Southeast 
Asia and the Need for Better Human Rights Protection 
 
First, it might be worth giving a brief overview of the human rights situation 
in Southeast Asia. Assessing this issue is not an easy task since human 
rights progress, violations, or the degree to which certain human rights 
claims are realized and realizable is extremely difficult to measure. 
Attempts to develop composite measures to rank countries human rights 
performance usually run in to problems and both quantitative and qualitative 
studies have shortcomings.51 One such index, indicated by Table 1.1, is the 
Humana human rights country rating. With the last update from 1991, the 
index is poorly outdated and therefore very limited as a measurement tool. 
However, it is the only specific comprehensive index the author could find 
as a source of human rights monitoring that provides an example in 
measuring human rights conditions. The index ranked most of the ASEAN  
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 Southeast Asia is usually synonymous with the ten states comprising ASEAN and Timor 
Leste. The countries are Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the 
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam.  
51
 Randall Peerenboom (et al.) (eds.) Human Rights in Asia: A comparative legal study of 
twelve Asian jurisdictions, France and the USA (Routlegde New York, 2006) pp. 2-6. 
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Nations below average with some at the very bottom of the scale.52  
A more recent and updated measurement index is provided by the World 
Justice Project.53 Although this index is strictly limited to measuring the 
adherence to the rule of law in practice in different countries, it can still 
provide some degree of indication of human rights conditions since 
adherence to the rule of law is an indispensable cornerstone in achieving 
accountable governments and the protection of human rights.54 Being a 
rather new project, the 2010 report has obvious limitations in that it only 
rates four of the ASEAN countries. According to the report, Indonesia, 
Thailand and the Philippines rate significantly lower than wealthier 
countries in the region and to the western world; however, they perform 
relatively well in comparison to countries from other regions of the world 
with similar income levels. As a contrast, Singapore is top ranked amongst 
the indexed countries in providing security and access to civil justice to its 
citizens. Yet it ranks very low in terms of open government, limited 
government powers, and fundamental rights.55 This tells us that, at least 
within these four countries, the rule of law is relatively strong, creating 
potential foundation for human rights protection. 
 
Another source of indication to the human rights situation in ASEAN 
countries is of course country reports from different human rights 
organisations. The human rights conditions in many ASEAN countries have 
commonly been rated as poor by international human rights monitoring 
                                               
52
 The rating is based on questions such as: Can one travel free in one’s country? Is there a 
risk of extrajudicial killings? The evaluation is then translated into points which are 
converted into a human rights rating of 100 %. The Humana ranking is in some ways 
problematic, and reflects a Western bias, since economic, and social rights have not been 
properly incorporated. For a discussion on the report’s methodology and limitations, see the 
introduction in Charles Humana, World Human Rights Guide 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 1992). 
53
 The World Justice Project Rule of Law Index 2010,  Available at:  
<http://www.worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/> (Accessed on May 18, 2011). 
54
 Ibid, p 1.  
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 Ibid, p 25.  
Table 1.1 Humana human rights rating of the ASEAN states in 1991. 
Country Human rights rating (%) 
World average is 62 
 Above average Below average 
Cambodia  33 
Indonesia  34 
Malaysia  61 
Myanmar  17 
Philippines 72  
Singapore  60 
Thailand  62 
Vietnam  27 
Brunei and Laos did not appear in the rating which did not cover countries with a 
population below one million or countries where the information obtained did not satisfy 
the evaluation criteria. 
 
Source: Charles Humana, World Human Rights Guide 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press 1992). 
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groups.56 Documentation from worldwide NGOs like Amnesty 
International, Human Rights Watch, regional and national human rights 
organisations still reveals a wide range of human rights violations across the 
ASEAN region.57 
 
The Asia Pacific Forum (APF), one of the leading regional human rights 
organisations in the Asia Pacific region, holds that, despite good progress in 
recent years, the region continues to face significant human rights 
challenges. Some are specific to individual countries, while others span the 
region. Ethnic conflicts and discrimination against minorities are problems 
in most of the countries. Unlawful detention, torture or other cruel, 
inhumane or degrading treatment are also common in many of the Member 
States. Child pornography, child soldiers, complaint handling, the death 
penalty, HIV-AIDS, internationally displaced persons, women’s rights, 
protection of migrant workers and human trafficking are all pressing 
issues.58 The member states of ASEAN also display a varied human rights 
record. While Myanmar usually has been considered one of the most 
unfriendly human rights states in the world, Thailand and the Philippines, 
not free from human rights abuses, have been more receptive than the rest of 
the ASEAN states to human rights issues and democratic overtures. 
 
The need for stronger commitment to human rights and a regional human 
rights regime has for long been visible among the ASEAN Member States, 
both from the aspect of positive developments in this region, but also from 
the aspect of lack thereof. On the positive side is the fact that in the national 
context, certain ASEAN States have made human rights a part of their 
national agendas. Several constitutions include provisions on human rights 
and some states have also developed national plans of action on human 
rights.59 In addition, four of the nations also have human rights institutions 
set up on the national level, Indonesia (known by its acronym Komnas 
HAM), Malaysia (SUAKHAM), the Philippines (CHRP) and Thailand 
(Khamakarn Sit). Such institutions provide a key check and balance against 
abuse of power.  
 
At the international level, the ASEAN Member States have over the years 
increasingly become parties to the key UN international human rights 
treaties. Participation in human rights instruments can be seen as a 
necessary but not sufficient condition in assessing states’ commitment to 
universal human rights. While ratification of instruments by states does not 
correspond and represent their performance, it represents at least prima facie 
acceptance of international accountability.60 In view of establishing a 
regional human rights regime, ratification of international human rights 
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 James T.H. Tang, supra note 7, p. 186. 
57
 See Amnesty Country Reports Available at: <http://thereport.amnesty.org/regions/asia-
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treaties can be considered crucial. As indicated by Table 1.2, all ASEAN 
countries have ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), 
and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women (CEDAW). In the past few years, more ASEAN countries 
have signed or acceded to the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR). Muntarbhorn (2003) argues that such 
development has provided “added weight to the need for an ASEAN human 
rights regime”.61 Several of the states have also undergone the UN 
Universal Periodic Review,62 and permitted special rapporteurs from 
thematic UN human rights committees to conduct on-site investigations.63  
 
At the Sub-regional level, ASEAN states have departed from previous 
practices. Ever since the Vienna Conference on Human Rights and the 1993 
joint Communiqué issued at the 26 Annual Ministerial Meeting, which laid 
the incentives for creating a regional human rights regime, human rights 
have been included on ASEAN’s agenda.64 All countries from ASEAN also 
participate in the UN supported annual workshops on human rights in the 
Asia-Pacific region.65  
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Table 1.2 
Ratification of International Human Rights Instruments as of November 2010 
 
NHRIs ICERD ICCPR ICCPR 
OP I 
ICCPR 
OP II 
ICESCR CRC CRC 
OP I 
CRC 
OP II 
CEDAW CEDAW 
OP I 
CAT CAT 
OP 
Singapore       X X  X    
Brunei       X  X X    
Malaysia 2000      X   X    
Thailand 2001 X X   X X X X X X X  
Philippines 1987 X X X X X X  X X X X  
Indonesia 1993 X X   X X   X  X  
Vietnam  X X   X X X X X    
Lao PDR  X X   X X X X X    
Cambodia  X X   X X X X X  X X 
Myanmar       X   X    
 
NHRIs – National Human Rights Institutions 
ICERD – Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination 
ICCPR – International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
ICCPR OP I - The Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights 
ICCPR OP II - The Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights 
ICESCR – International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights 
CRC – Convention on the Rights of the Child 
CRC OP I - Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
on the involvement of children in armed conflict 
 
Source: http://www.bayefsky.com/ (Accessed on May 17, 2011) 
 
CRC OP II - Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography 
CEDAW – Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination 
against Women 
CEDAW OP I - Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
CAT – Convention Against Torture 
CAT OP - Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
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On the negative side is of course the fact that human right abuses still occur 
to a wide extent, albeit to a various degree in the ASEAN Member States. 
This shows that including concepts of human rights in national constitution 
does not mean that human rights provisions will be properly respected in 
practice. On the international level remains the fact that almost none of the 
states are parties to the optional protocols to the core international human 
rights treaties. So in fact, no complaints can go to the UN human rights 
bodies. Furthermore, some states have made extensive reservations to these 
treaties indicating a lack of will to fully submit to international human rights 
norms.66 The compliance with these bodies in terms of reporting has also 
been varying greatly with many states submitting reports too late or not at 
all. The fact that it took about 15 years from incentive to action to establish 
a regional human rights framework also reveal that in general, human rights 
progress in the region is slow.  
 
2.1.2. Reasons for the Lack of Regional Human Rights 
Cooperation 
 
Why is it that Southeast Asian states seem to have been slow or reluctant, 
relative to other regions, to establish more firm human rights cooperation at 
the regional level? Essentially, there are a number of factors that can explain 
the slow progress towards human rights in the region. Carlos Medina has 
captured some of the main reasons usually put forward to explain the lack of 
a Southeast Asian human rights regime:  
 
“Human rights issues are considered by many states as internal affairs; while states accept 
the concept of universality of human rights, it is argued that substantial differences exists 
between international human right norms and the customs and practices within the region; 
many states believe individual rights must give way to demands of national security and 
economic growth, or that human rights can be realized only after a certain level of 
economic advancement has been achieved; and any human rights mechanism cannot 
possibly encompass the entire range of diversity among states within the region in terms of 
historical background, cultures and traditions, religions and level of economic and political 
development.”67 
 
Such objections might be considered more or less poor excuses for not 
implementing human rights. The following sections will consider some of 
these arguments. 
 
2.1.3. Regional Diversity 
 
“Southeast Asia, Southeast Asia. What is Southeast Asia, to you and to 
me?” Professor Vitit Muntarbhorn, a prominent Thai international human 
rights lawyer and co-chairperson of the Working Group for an ASEAN 
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Regional Human Rights Mechanism, asked at the very first International 
Conference on Human Rights in Southeast Asia.68 No doubt, the question is 
a justified and essential one to study and understand the prospects for 
human rights cooperation in this region. Muntarbhorn went on to state: 
 
“Is it a state of geography? Ten countries of ASEAN but more. Should we include East 
Timor? Or could we even include China, maybe Hong Kong, some say India even. Or is 
Southeast Asia a state of ethnicity? According to one rapporteur there are more than 400 
ethnic groups in Southeast Asia. Or is Southeast Asia a state of mind, a state of art? To me, 
a state of poetry.” 
 
Besides the geographical delimitations incorporated into the phrase 
Southeast Asia, whether how one chooses to look at this region, it is 
inevitable to come to another conclusion than that this region is 
exceptionally diverse in many respects. It is important to be aware of this 
fact in order to better understand the prospects for cooperation in this 
region, not at least when it comes to human rights. It is hard to define this 
diversity. When it comes to the ten nations comprising ASEAN they differ 
in culture, religion, philosophical, and social structures. Their political 
ideologies, legal systems and degrees of economic development vary 
greatly. Peerenboom (2006) asserts that these are some of the most common 
factors linked in empirical studies to better understand human rights 
protection, and it is often held that Southeast Asian countries share neither a 
political history nor common values needed to establish any firm human 
rights cooperation.69  
 
Just a brief overview would illustrate this diversity.70 Historically, the 
region has been filled with turmoil with centuries of competing colonial 
interests of the British, French, Dutch, Americans, Spanish and Portuguese 
that somewhat cut off the historical web of connections in Southeast Asia. 
The colonial past and the countries vigorous pursuit of self-determination is 
of course a crucial factor when considering human rights cooperation. As 
Yasuki (1999) points out, “For those who have experienced colonial rule 
and interventions under such beautiful slogan as ‘humanity’ and 
‘civilisation’, the term human rights looks like nothing more than another 
beautiful slogan by which great powers rationalize their interventionist 
policies”.71. When ASEAN was conceived in 1967, the Cold War was at its 
height, the region far from spared with violence. Regional disputes were 
fresh, and communist insurgencies were raging inside some Member 
States.72  
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After independence, most Southeast Asian states were preoccupied with two 
central concerns: creating national unity and enhancing economic 
development.73 With the plural societies divided by race, language and 
religion, this was not an easy task. A great source of political violence in 
post-colonial Southeast Asia has therefore been incomplete and 
unsuccessful nation-building and the political and socio economic 
marginalisation of minorities.74 The reasons for instability in the region are 
therefore nowadays mainly domestic.75 Difference in population size, 
ranging from more than 240 million in Indonesia to less than half a million 
in Brunei76 helps explain divergences in instability among the nations. 
Population size is also a proxy for ethnic diversity, which has led to conflict, 
both against the state, but also between different minority groups. Such 
instability has been invoked to support broad state powers with strict 
national security laws, thus justifying more restriction on rights.77 
 
Southeast Asia also clearly boasts a wide diversity of religious systems and 
cultural practices. While Thailand, Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam 
for example are predominantly Buddhist, a considerable proportion of the 
populations of Brunei, Malaysia and Indonesia are Muslim while in the 
Philippines, Christianity is the dominant religion.78 The role of religion in 
society as well as the relationship between government and religion also 
differs between nations. According to Fox (2008) and in very generalized 
terms, Muslim states tend to be more supportive of state religions and, on 
average, place more restrictions on religious minorities while Buddhist and 
Christian states tend to be more tolerant.79  
 
While heritage from colonial history and religion is visible throughout the 
societies, it also permeates the legal systems among the ASEAN Member 
States, and there is a great variation among the states on key legal 
institutions and practices that help ensure protection of human rights. Even 
just a brief survey would readily illustrate the intricate mosaic of legal 
systems. While all the national legal systems have been influenced from a 
variety of sources, Brunei, Malaysia and Singapore carry strong features 
from the English common law system.  Islamic legal influences are also 
visible in Brunei and Malaysia. Myanmar’s legal system is also based on the 
common law system inherited from the British era even though the military 
regime now rules by decree without an independent judicial system. The 
legal systems in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia carry influences from French 
civil law as well as communist theory. In Indonesia, a mix of traditional 
customary law, Dutch colonial law and modern Indonesian law makes up 
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the legal structure. The Philippines have a blend between civil law system 
and common law system inherited in part by colonization by Spain and the 
United States. In Thailand, the legal system is very much influenced by the 
European civil law system, but traces of common law are also visible as 
well as Muslim laws.80  
  
2.1.4. Democracy, Development and Human Rights  
 
Levels of democracy and economic development are usually considered the 
most significant factors influencing the approach to human rights in 
ASEAN states and explaining the slow development.81 The political systems 
and democratic situation in the states display a great variety. In terms of 
democracy, they have been categorized as democratic to semi-democratic, 
semi-authoritarian to authoritarian.82 Countries like the Philippines, 
Indonesia and Thailand have undergone political regime transition from 
authoritarian to democratic. Cambodia, Malaysia and Singapore have their 
own unique brands of illiberal Asian democracy. Dissidence and advocacy 
of alternative systems are marginalised in Malaysia while practically 
outlawed in Singapore.   Communist single state parties exist in Vietnam 
and Laos. Myanmar is ruled by its authoritarian military junta while Brunei 
is under the benign but authoritarian rule of its Sultan.83 Table 1.3 shows the  
Freedom in the World survey ranking, a tool that can be used to assess the 
democratic situation in states.84 The index from 2010 rates Indonesia as 
‘free’, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand as ‘partly free’, and 
the rest of the countries as ‘not free’.85  
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Table 1.3 
Freedom House combined average 
rating 
Score 
FREE  
Indonesia 2,5 
PARTLY FREE  
Philippines 3,5 
Malaysia 4,5 
Singapore 4,5 
NOT FREE  
Brunei 5,5 
Cambodia 5,5 
Lao PDR 6 
Vietnam 6 
Myanmar 7 
Source: Freedom House Data 
<http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=25&year=2010> 
(Accessed on November 24, 2010) 
 
The economies and levels of development display an equally visible 
divergence. Singapore can be found at one end of the spectrum while 
Myanmar and Cambodia at the other and the rest of the countries at various 
levels. Table 1.4 presents figures from The Human Development Index 
(HDI) combined by the Gross Domestic Product per capita in each of these 
States. The HDI is devised by the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) and measures development by combining indicators of life 
expectancy, educational attainment and income. 86  
 
Table 1.4   
Human Development Index 
Ranking 2010 
HDI Ranking GDP per capita USD 
Very High Human Development   
Singapore 27 50266 
Brunei 37 49915 
High Human Development   
Malaysia 57 14410 
Medium Human Development   
Thailand 92 8328 
Philippines 97 3061 
Indonesia 108 4394 
Vietnam 112 3097 
Lao PDR 122 2404 
Cambodia 124 1952 
Low Human Development   
Myanmar 132 1596 
Source: Human Development Index, 
 http://hdr.undp.org/en/humandev/> (Accessed on November 24, 2010) 
 
Democracy and human rights are distinct but related concepts. Neither has a 
single definition – both are complex and depend on different interpretations 
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in different societies. David Beetham asserts that “democracy and human 
rights occupy different areas of the political sphere: one is a matter of the 
organisation of government while the other a question of individual rights 
and their defence.”87 According to Robert Dahl, “democracy guarantees 
citizens a number of fundamental rights that nondemocratic systems do not, 
and cannot grant.”88 Democratic forms of government can be conceived as 
an essential mean for achieving human rights. Elements of democracy and 
human rights of each individual country can be assessed by examining their 
national constitution, as constitutions contains basic ideas and aspirations 
and shows how each country approaches human rights. A closer glance at 
constitutions in ASEAN Member States reveals that rights and freedoms of 
the people are recognized quite well, at least in some of the states.89 
However, including such concepts in national constitutions does not mean 
that human rights provisions will be properly respected in practice. 
Democracy is often held to be understood differently between Western 
states and those in Southeast Asia. For some countries, the Western 
definition of democracy, human rights and political pluralism has been, and 
still is, considered a threat to the security and stability within the state.90 In 
most, if not all ASEAN Member States, press freedom, the political and 
civil rights of individuals, and the freedom of expression and assembly in 
particular have been curtailed.91  
 
Democracy and human rights is also related to development and economic 
growth, much so within the Member States of ASEAN. Jones (2008) even 
argues that “the greatest challenge facing regional integration lies in 
addressing the development divide, not the democratic deficit, among the 
member states”.92 Strive for economic development has always been 
considered the primary objective amongst the states in ASEAN. Most of 
them have rated economic development more highly than human rights and 
argued that economic growth should come before democratic reforms.93 
Singapore’s former Foreign Minister, Wong Kan Seng, for example asserted 
that “poverty makes a mockery of all civil liberties”.94 Some of the 
governments have used the importance of a growing economy as an 
argument to defend the need to rule with a strong hand.95 States like 
Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia provide striking examples that rapid 
growth can take place under authoritarian leadership. Especially Singapore 
has challenged the notion that democracy is a key to economic growth, or, 
put differently, that economic growth would inevitably lead to political 
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reforms, democratisation and improved protection of human rights.96 As a 
contrast stands the Philippines, which faced democratic reforms before 
many of the other ASEAN countries, but still does rather poorly when it 
comes to economic growth and national security. Lastly, countries like 
Myanmar and Laos display a lack of both democratisation and economic 
growth and improvement in the protection of human rights.  
 
The relationship between democracy, development and human rights tends 
to be very complex, lacking any precise formula for when, and in 
combination with what, an improvement in any of the three will take place. 
They are all related in the sense that growth in one may boost a growth in 
the other, but there is definitely not any linear relationship. While 
democracy may be considered an essential pre-requisite for the realisation of 
human rights, Peerenboom (2006) argues that human rights progress only 
occurs once democracy has reached a certain stage.97 The diversity in the 
political systems of governments and level of development, together with a 
general lack of consolidated democracy, which reflects the ASEAN Member 
States view on democracy and the attitude towards economic development, 
in many ways explains the policies and practices in the field of human rights 
in ASEAN countries.98 It is probably the most crucial factor why national 
human rights records remain poor and the reason for lack of regional human 
rights cooperation within ASEAN. In addition, while concepts like 
democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms are now 
included in the ASEAN Charter, this is certainly no guarantee for 
implementation.  
 
2.1.5. Cultural Relativism and Asian Values  
 
Notions of ‘Asian democracy’ and development are closely interwoven with 
Asian values discourse. The concept of specific ‘Asian values’ is often used 
as an explanation why Asian states did not adopt human rights but instead 
justified more authoritarian regimes. Although not specific to Southeast 
Asia, in the beginning of the 1990s many ASEAN countries propounded 
‘Asian values’ and regional approaches to human rights and democracy that 
emphasized difference in culture and level of development. The Asian 
values a debate was especially fuelled much due to provocative remarks by 
strong political leaders from Singapore and Malaysia. It also gained 
geopolitical support from China’s issuance of its White Paper on Human 
Rights in 1991 and the issuance of the 1993 Bangkok Declaration.99  
 
In essence, Asian values have been used to promote cultural relativism as an 
argument against the universality of human rights. In the run up to the 1993 
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World Conference on Human Rights Asian governments adopted the 
Bangkok Declaration, which is frequently cited to illustrate the relativist 
stance, or situational uniqueness, of Asian governments when it comes to 
human rights. The Bangkok Declaration Article 8 holds that Asian 
governments: 
 
“recognize that while human rights are universal in nature, they must be considered in the 
context of a dynamic and evolving process of internal norm-setting, bearing in mind the 
significance of national and regional particularities and various historical, cultural and 
religious backgrounds.”100 
 
A similar respect for regional particularities appears in the Terms of 
Reference to the AICHR.101 In his opening speech during the International 
Conference of Human Rights in Southeast Asia in 2010, the Secretary 
General of ASEAN Dr. Surin Pitsuwan reconfirmed this position again by 
stating: 
 
“I think we have to go back to the very fundamental concept of individual rights and human 
rights where I think the two traditions, east and west have some fundamental differences. I 
am saying this not arguing that we do not have universal norms for human rights. I’m just 
saying that universal norms are being evolved and developed to serve our particular stages 
of social, economical and political development.”102 
 
It is not quite clear whether such statements, or legal formulations, merely 
qualifies or in effect denies the idea of universality, since they are 
contradicted by the notion of regional particularities. Some have argued that 
it merely entails that Southeast Asian nations does not have an alternative 
concept of human  rights but rather a different approach to how these rights 
should be interpreted and implemented.103 However, if more weight is 
attached to particularistic considerations, the more likely it is that the 
universality of human rights is stripped of its substantive content.104 
 
2.1.5.1 What are Core Asian Values? 
Although there is no exact definition of what constitute Asian values, key 
Asian values asserts emphasis on communitarian values, such as family, 
rather than individual ones, communal peace, social harmony, greater 
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reverence for traditions, strong leadership and respect for authority.105 Such 
values are claimed by many governments as a key factor to economic 
success.106 The main stance on human rights from the Asian values debate 
can be summarized in the following points: 
 
First, Southeast Asian states have preferred to deal with human rights within 
their own jurisdiction. Amitav Acharya (1995) has explained the reluctance 
towards human rights as partially an “instrument by the West to dominate 
the East. Human rights have been considered a threat by ASEAN states 
[…]. Thus a new challenge for them is to take collective action to protect 
regional norms and autonomy against ‘external’ pressure.”107 International 
supervision by human rights mechanisms is viewed as a threat to national 
sovereignty. In relations to this, the states have been reluctant to engage in a 
direct confrontation with the UN, stressing national sovereignty and 
protested against western dominance in the UN.108 Furthermore, several 
ASEAN governments have also criticised the 1948 Universal Declaration on 
Human Rights because many states were not yet independent and could 
therefore have no part in its formulation.109  
 
Second, most ASEAN states have also emphasised the primacy of economic 
development over human rights. This argument is, in part, that civil and 
political rights are neither meaningful nor feasible in conditions of want and 
poverty.110 Human rights can be implemented only after a country reaches a 
certain level of development. Thus, there is a linkage between human rights, 
democracy and economic development in that the States have argued that 
economic development and success requires political stability, which in turn 
requires authoritarian governments and respect for traditional cultural 
values.111  
 
Third, and closely related to the second point, is that many ASEAN states 
have not been comfortable with one category of human rights prioritized 
over another. They claim that civil and political rights can be a hindrance to 
economic development and public order. Thus, many prefer advocating for 
economic social and cultural rights.112  
 
Fourth, in most ASEAN countries there is a concern that western concept of 
human rights puts too much emphasis on the individual rather than the 
community. In many Member States, communal rights are considered 
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equally important as the rights of the individual who are responsible to the 
society. There need not to be any clear-cut contradiction of individual versus 
communal rights in promoting human rights. However, in achieving this 
balance within the context of ASEAN Member States it is sometimes 
inevitable that individual rights are limited for the best of the community.113  
There has been an extensive on-going debate regarding the Asian values 
discourse. Some scholars put great emphasis on them. Mauzy (1997) argues 
that there is no single Asian view or set of values, no uniform ideology and 
no single cultural system. However, when the term is applied to Southeast 
Asia, there are a considerable number of shared values and important 
commonalities. These common values, along with shared regional interests, 
serve to give the ASEAN states a bond, which in turn helps provide a basis 
for cooperative endeavours and for arriving at consensual decisions.114  
Other commentators have made the point that it is oversimplified and even 
absurd to talk about Asian values since the region is known for the diversity 
of its cultures, religions, traditions, and histories.115 Especially within 
ASEAN, those values may have gained more attention than they deserve 
much thanks to authoritarian leaders in mainly Singapore, Malaysia and 
Indonesia who do not represent the entire region.116 Peerenboom (2006) 
underlines that, the discussions about human rights, Asian values have many 
times been politicized, and “clearly, some authoritarian regimes have used 
the rhetoric of Asian values for self-serving ends, playing the cultural card 
to deny citizens their rights and fend off foreign criticism”.117 Today, 
however, many argue that the Asian values discourse has lost some of the 
significance it played in the human rights debate in Southeast Asia, 
especially after the 1997 financial crisis.118 
 
2.2 CONCLUDING REMARKS - PERCEPTIONS OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 
2.2.1. An Ambivalent Human Rights Stance  
 
What does this overview tell us about the human right stance in Southeast 
Asia? It is clear that both human rights situations and performances vary 
widely among the states. The tremendous diversity also makes unified 
human rights stance and cooperation very difficult.  Southeast Asian states, 
much like their cultures, approach to human rights have been and are 
different from other parts of the world. In relations to democracy and 
development, most ASEAN states have rated economic development more 
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highly than human rights.119 The role of the state in the development and the 
appropriateness of democratic relative to authoritarian systems of 
government in its achievement are closely inter-linked issues and the 
approach differs from those of the west.120  
 
On the other hand, the situational uniqueness is not something particularly 
unique to Southeast Asia. In Europe for example when balancing between 
the individual’s interest and the public interest and morals of a country, the 
European Court of Human Rights has developed a “margin of appreciation”.  
In this, the Court display that it is impossible to find a uniform European 
stance on moral issues to guide its interpretations.121 Similar, in Africa, the 
African Charter on Human and People’s Rights clearly considers regional 
particularities, both in its preamble and its provisions. It also emphasizes the 
duty of the individual towards the community and to preserve particular 
African values.122 Clearly, every region displays a tremendous diversity and 
within this diversity, there are some dominant trends and common patterns, 
which, under the right circumstances, allows for human rights cooperation. 
Taking this into consideration, the important question, when examining the 
prospects for an ASEAN human rights regime, is whether there is some 
consistency and unity in the policies and articulations of the states when it 
comes to human rights?  
 
Tommy Koh, the Singaporean member of the High Level Task Force 
(HLTF), a group of government officials convened to draft the ASEAN 
Charter, reaffirmed that: “[t]here was no issue that took up more of our time, 
no issue as controversial and which divided the ASEAN family so deeply as 
human rights”.123 The statement shows that much of ASEAN’s credibility to 
the outside world and cooperation opportunities lies foremost within the 
economic sphere. Other strong points have been security concerns, stability 
in the region and a good measure of cohesion amongst its members. Most of 
the success and cohesion are based on at least two pillars which include the 
written norms of non-interference and the principle of consensus. These 
norms, as we shall see in the next chapter, find a prominent place in 
ASEAN and are thus core norms within the new human rights regime.  
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Tommy Koh also observed that the ASEAN family is divided into two 
groups on the issue of human rights. Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines 
and Thailand are positive more open to human rights and norm change. 
They have ratified many of the core international human right treaties, have 
national human rights institution in place, and in terms of democracy and 
development at least they are not at the bottom of the scale. On the other 
side, Jones (2008) points out, are Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam 
who constitute a distinct group whose standard of living, GDP, human rights 
and standards of rule-based governance are substantially below the other 
ASEAN members.124 Brunei and Singapore are somewhere between the 
camps.125  
 
It is clear that local circumstances including cultural differences, religious 
traditions, economic development, and the nature of legal and political 
institutions are clearly relevant and must be considered with respect to 
implementing human rights. Implementation will only be effective and 
enforceable when it finds support in the local and regional particularities. 
The diversity and ambivalence clearly poses a formidable obstacle to 
advancement of human rights in the region. It illustrates that there is no 
official, clear or comprehensive position on human rights and clear 
divergences exist amongst individual ASEAN Member States.126 Although 
some core values have been articulated through the Asia values discourse, 
these have stressed for the sovereignty of States over human rights and that 
regional particularities must be taken under consideration when addressing 
human rights issues. This might be considered poor excuses for not 
implementing human rights. However, with the ratification of the ASEAN 
Charter and the emerging human rights regime, a tendency towards change 
can be observed in that at least now all States agree that human rights can be 
discussed. However, it would be wrong to assume from this alone that 
ASEAN member states are close to having a uniform approach to 
interpreting human rights norms.  
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CHAPTER III 
3. Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
This chapter gives an overview of ASEAN as a regional cooperation and its 
normative structures to better understand the prospect for human rights 
cooperation. It also gives a brief overview on how ASEAN traditionally has 
tried to deal with human rights situations in practice.  
 
3.1. A BRIEF HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
ASEAN was established in 1967 by the Bangkok Declaration.127 The key 
aims can be found in the two first paragraphs of the very brief declaration: 
 
1. To accelerate the economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the 
region through joint endeavours in the spirit of equality and partnership in order to 
strengthen the foundation for a prosperous and peaceful community of South-East Asian 
Nations;  
 
2. To promote regional peace and stability through abiding respect for justice and the rule 
of law in the relationship among countries of the region and adherence to the principles of 
the United Nations Charter. 
 
Intriguingly, human rights were not mentioned in the declaration, but it can 
be argued that the aims, such as justice and the rule of law, interrelate 
closely with the need to promote human rights in the region.128 By affirming 
adherence to the principles of the UN Charter the founding members also 
accepted its purposes and principles. Even though the main purpose was to 
create an organisation for economic, social and cultural cooperation, 
security issues implicitly played a role much due to the then prevailing 
circumstances in Southeast Asia.129 The five founding members were 
Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore and the Philippines. Brunei joined 
ASEAN in 1984 as the sixth member. In 1995 Vietnam became a member, 
and in 1997 Laos and Burma/Myanmar followed. The membership of 
Cambodia was delayed until 1999 because of internal political turmoil. East 
Timor is expected to join in 2012 as the 11th member.  
 
Given the diversity of member states in terms of size, colonial experiences, 
culture, ethnic composition, and identity, and that the founding members 
also lacked any significant previous experience in multilateral cooperation, 
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the creation of ASEAN was somewhat of a surprise.130 When the foreign 
ministers of the five founding countries established ASEAN they presented 
a very different picture of what they had launched, showing the early 
ambiguities in this regional cooperation.131 Singapore’s Sinnathamby maybe 
best signalled what typical ASEAN cooperation would look like by stating: 
“that we have now erected the skeleton and must give flesh and blood to 
it”.132 This statement mirrors the “evolutionary approach” that has been 
frequently adopted within ASEAN. It suggests starting small and 
developing towards something more significant - the progressive realisation 
of something over a period of time.133 The recently established human rights 
framework is no exception to this approach. 
 
ASEAN was not envisioned to be a supranational institution nor was it 
intended to be a stepping stone towards integration. In brief, it was 
established as an association, which would encourage and facilitate 
understanding and cooperation based on mutual benefit.134 Even though 
early expectations for ASEAN were low, over the plus 40 years of 
existence, the Association has successfully institutionalised a network on 
regular meetings amongst its Member States that enabled the governments 
to better cooperate on problems and challenges the region faced.135 Until 
today, ASEAN has made a considerable progress and evolved into what 
some consider being one of the most successful examples of regional 
cooperation in the developing world.136  
 
3.1.1. ASEAN’s Core Norms and Principles 
 
Ever since its establishment the ASEAN Member States have embraced a 
number of principles that have defined the parameters of their interaction 
with each other. To understand the normative framework of ASEAN that 
has now been formalized through the Charter it is important to understand 
what these norms are as well as where they came from. According to 
Acharya (2001): “regional institution, including those who exhibit the 
characteristics of a security community, may learn their norms from global 
organisations, or other regional groups. Their norms also derive from the 
local, social, cultural and political milieu. ASEAN’s norms came from a 
mix of these two sources”.137  
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3.1.1.1. 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation and Other Important 
Agreements 
The great differences amongst the nations together with outside turmoil in 
the world made ASEAN face a number of challenges over the years. The 
fall of colonialism left states with difficult tasks such as nation-building as 
well as economic, social and political consolidation. Sources of instability 
were both internal and external. With the Cold War intensified through the 
Indochina Wars; internally, several states faced threats of communist 
subversion and ethnic separatism, while externally, they faced the threat of 
becoming engulfed by rivalling super powers.138 In 1976 the Treaty of 
Amity and Cooperation (TAC) was signed. The agreement strengthened the 
members’ commitment to ASEAN by establishing the principles of non-
interference in the domestic affairs of member states; the settlement of 
disputes among members by peaceful means; the development of a regional 
identity; and continuing cooperation in regional economic and social 
development.139 The same year, the Declaration of ASEAN Concord was 
adopted which urged member states to “vigorously develop an awareness of 
regional identity and exert all efforts to create a strong ASEAN 
community”.140 While the 1967 Bangkok Declaration had assured its 
members that the grouping would preserve their national identities, this 
objective needed to be reconciled with the development of a regional 
existence.141  
 
In the wake of the 1997 financial crisis ASEAN summits launched a number 
of initiatives to enhance the region’s security and increase the integration. 
One of the most notably, the ASEAN Concord II, adopted in Bali 2003, 
established a framework for achievement of an integrated ASEAN 
community built on three pillars of economic, security and socio-cultural 
cooperation and integration. It also reaffirmed that the TAC is the key code 
of conduct governing relations between states and a diplomatic instrument 
for the promotion of peace and stability in the region.142  
 
Most ASEAN norms, although of central importance to the political security 
role of ASEAN, are by themselves hardly something unique. The doctrine 
of non-interference, non-intervention and peaceful settlement of disputes are 
all enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations (Article 2) as well as other 
international treaties. What made ASEAN really distinctive were the 
combination of norms and decision making which came to be known as the 
‘ASEAN Way’.143   
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3.1.1.2. The ASEAN Way 
Although not explicitly defined, the ASEAN Way can be seen as the 
ASEAN members’ distinctive approach to political and security 
cooperation. It usually refers to a particular style of decision-making, but 
some scholars have defines it as both norms and style.144 According to 
Acharya, “the ASEAN Way is a term favoured by ASEAN’s leaders 
themselves to describe the process of intra-mural interaction to distinguish it 
from other, especially Western, multilateral settings. But there is no official 
definition of the term. It is a loosely used concept whose meaning remains 
vague and contested.”145 Former Secretary-General of ASEAN, H.E. Dato’ 
Ajit Singh in 1996 offered an explication of the ASEAN Way by stating 
that: 
 
[The ASEAN Way] … is that indefinable expression that readily comes to mind when we 
want to explain how and why we do the things the way we do. Although the expression 
seems instinctive and intuitive, yet it is based on some very firm principles and practices. 
We respect each other’s sovereignty and independence and do not interfere in each other’s 
internal affairs. Bilateral issues are avoided. We treat each other as equals. Decisions are 
taken only when all are comfortable with them. Close consultations precede these 
decisions. Consensus is the rule. The question of face is very important and every effort is 
made to ensure that no party feels hurt in an argument or a discussion. This does not mean 
that we do not have disagreements. We often do, but we do not, as a rule, air them in 
public. It also means that knowing each other as well as we do, we can disagree strongly 
and yet, at the end of the day, play golf together, eat Durians or do the Karaoke. And 
ASEAN is none the worse for it:” 146 
 
Former Secretary General of ASEAN, Rodolfo C. Severino has added that 
the Southeast Asian way of dealing with one another “is not just a matter of 
history; it is a matter of culture”.147 At the core of the ASEAN Way stand 
six core norms.  
 
• Sovereign equality 
• The non-recourse to the use of force and peaceful settlement of 
conflicts 
• Non-interference in the internal affairs of member states, non 
intervention 
• Non involvement of ASEAN to address unresolved bilateral 
conflicts between members 
• Guided diplomacy 
• Mutual respect and tolerance between the Member States 
 
First, ASEAN members value and respect each other’s sovereignty, 
meaning that they do not interfere in each other’s internal affairs. They 
always seek non-recourse to the use of force and peaceful settlement of 
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disputes, norms that can be found in the 1976 Treaty of Amity and 
Cooperation. Second, the ASEAN states emphasize consultation and 
consensus in relations at the regional level. Consultation process is often 
informal, steeped in the principle of quiet diplomacy, and negotiations with 
respect to specific issues are non-confrontational with the overall goal of 
finding a position that all parties finds acceptable.148 Moreover, among 
ASEAN members there is an understanding that regional cooperation is to 
be brought about by first negotiating a politically acceptable framework, and 
then working out the formal institutions, legal obligations and technical 
issues later. This “evolutionary approach” to regional relations is arguably 
what has ensured a regional stability within Southeast Asia that has helped 
to foster economic growth and social stability, while at the same time 
increasing the sense of security among all ASEAN member states.149 This 
approach is also chosen for the ASEAN human rights regime. While the 
ASEAN Way has proven to have its advantages, harsh criticism has also 
been directed towards it. This is especially true when it comes to human 
rights in the region. 
  
 3.1.2. The ASEAN Way – a Weak Way in Terms of Legal 
Cooperation 
 
When it comes to prospects for human rights cooperation within ASEAN, it 
is also worth considering the Association in terms of legal obligations and 
norms, “At a pace comfortable to all” is a common phrase in ASEAN 
documents showing the Member States preference for caution and 
gradualism in developing regional institutions and legally binding 
agreements.150 ASEAN has been able to produce a myriad of declarations, 
concords, instruments, agreements or arrangements that have neither 
required formal ratification nor been legally binding and had relied on 
consultation and consensus instead.  
 
That it took the organisation almost nine years to conclude it first legally 
binding treaty, foremost in the area of peace and security, with the Treaty of 
Amity and Cooperation in 1976 serve as a good example of the loose forms 
of cooperation. Since then most agreements carrying some measure of legal 
obligations have been overwhelmingly economic in nature.151  
                                               
148
 Jürgen Haacke, supra note 144, p. 1.    
149
 Richard Stubbs, supra note 130, p. 223-224. 
150
 Rodolfo C. Severino, Southeast Asia In Search of An ASEAN Community: Insights from 
the former ASEAN Secretaty General, (ISEAS 2006) p. 151. 
151
 It took another ten years for ASEAN to produce the next agreement that carried some 
binding force. This was the 1977 Preferential Trading Arrangements. Yet another ten years 
were to pass before ASEAN was to conclude, at the third ASEAN Summit in 1987, the 
Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments and the agreement on the 
standstill and rollback of non-tariff barriers, both of which conferred legal rights and 
obligations upon their signatories. The conclusion of the CEPT/AFTA agreement in 1992 
launched the economic integration. Besides the TAC, another key agreement mainly 
concerning peace and security, is the 1995  Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone 
treaty legally committing their states not to “develop, manufacture or otherwise acquire, 
36 
 
 
In terms of human rights, since its establishment, ASEAN has been able to 
produce five declarations: the Declaration of Advancement of Women in the 
ASEAN region (1988), Declaration of the Commitment for Children in 
ASEAN (2001), Declaration against Trafficking in Persons Particularly 
Woman and Children (2004), Declaration on the Elimination of Violence 
Against Women in the ASEAN Region (2004), and the Declaration on the 
Protection of the Rights of Migrant Workers (2007). These instruments are 
declarations and not legally binding. They merely indicate political 
commitments.   
 
3.1.3. ASEAN’s Human Rights Approach in Practice - 
Constructive Engagement Strategy 
 
While formulating an official stance on the meaning and scope of human 
rights is one thing, managing real human rights problems has been an 
entirely different exercise.152 ASEAN has traditionally adopted a policy of 
‘constructive engagement’ when addressing the human rights practices of its 
Member States. Like its origin, the scope and policy of constructive 
engagement remains obscure, but it has been most notable in response 
towards the situation in Myanmar. The country remains the most pressing 
issue even today when it comes to human rights cooperation. When the 
military junta (SLORC) in 1988 seized power in Myanmar the 
developments posed a new challenge for ASEAN. The Association 
responded with a policy that “seeks not to embarrass the object of 
engagement through isolation or condemnation,” but, rather, to ensure that 
“change is induced through peer pressure.” This policy was much in line 
with the ASEAN Way core principle of non-interference in the internal 
affairs of a state, but also a pragmatic move to respond to other concerns as 
well, such as security, political and economic interests.153 
 
The action (or inaction) of ASEAN’s constructive engagement policy has 
generally been met with criticism from civil society groups, many of whom 
view ASEAN’s human rights stance with mistrust. These groups argue that 
the policy has been used to allow the association and its various 
subcommittees to ignore pervasive human rights abuses being committed 
against the peoples it purports to represent.154 The policy illustrates the 
unwillingness of ASEAN to exclude one of its members on the notion of 
human rights and that other interests are of more important concern.  
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3.2. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Considering what type of cooperation ASEAN originally was intended to 
be, and what it has become, it is not hard to see why establishing a regional 
human rights regime within such a framework has been difficult. In terms of 
legal obligations and norms, ASEAN has never been associated with 
international law and treaties. The institutions (norms, principles, rules, 
decision-making procedures) that do exist within ASEAN are ‘soft 
institutions’ which are not legally binding because they are based on 
convention and informal agreement rather than formal treaties. What can be 
concluded about ASEAN’s commitment to agree upon legally binding 
agreements is that they are few and overwhelmingly economic and security 
oriented in nature, reflecting the Associations original intentions. Thus, the 
cornerstone of ASEAN has been voluntarism not legalism.155 In that sense, 
even though ASEAN has developed into more than just a group of friends 
holding annual meetings to promote regional stability and economic growth, 
the Association is not comparable to the highly institutionalized EU, and 
clearly less than the UN that asserts the power to impose binding obligations 
on its Member States. Although changes may now be visible with the 
ASEAN Charter- turning the Association into a more rules based, 
institutionalized organization, and even introducing human rights on the 
ASEAN agenda, suggesting a small deviation from the ASEAN Way- no 
one can deny that human rights issues and the establishment of an ASEAN 
human right regime are still challenging matters within this Association. 
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CHAPTER IV 
4. International Human Right Regimes 
This chapter gives a brief overview of human right regimes and their 
normative framework. Donnelly (2007) defines a regime as “a set of 
principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures accepted by states 
(and other international actors) as binding within an issue area.”156 The 
definition is broad, but regimes are essentially political creations to 
overcome perceived problems arising from inadequately regulated or 
insufficiently coordinated national action.157 While there are no existing 
international legalised standards on how a regional human rights regime 
should be framed, it is simple to answer at least what it should not do, and 
that is to function below international human rights standards. A full-scale 
comparison between different human right regimes, foremost the regional 
ones, is not possible to make here. Rather, some general principles and 
common features will be highlighted to illustrate how they can be assessed. 
When examining the ASEAN human rights regime in the coming chapter, 
this examination is of relevance to assess the regime, what tools it can 
adopt, whether it meet international standards, and what it can bring in 
addition to the already existing monitoring systems outside the ASEAN 
region.158 
  
4.1 NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK 
4.1.1. The United Nations Human Rights Framework 
 
The ongoing process of development of international human rights law has 
its normative basis in the Charter of the United Nations (UN Charter).159 
The UN Charter has given rise to a vast body of international and regional 
human rights law and the establishment of a number of institutions and 
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mechanism with the purpose to promote and supervise its 
implementation.160  
 
The three major human rights provisions of the Charter are Article 1(3), 
55(c) and 56. The first of these provisions recognizes that one of the 
purposes of the United Nations is international cooperation in solving 
various international problems and “promoting and encouraging respect for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to 
race, sex, language or religion.”161 This provision is amplified by Article 55 
(c) which states: 
 
With a view to the creations of stability and well-being which are necessary for the peaceful 
and friendly relations among nations based on the respect for the principles of equal rights 
and self-determination of peoples, the United Nations shall promote... 
 
(c) universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all 
without distinction as to race, sex language, or religion.  
 
Article 56 imposes these obligations on the Member States by providing 
that: “all Members pledge themselves to take joint action in cooperation 
with the Organisation for the achievement of the purposes set forth in 
Article 55.” What can be concluded about these rather short provisions is 
that the Member States obligation under Article 56 is limited to the 
promotion of human rights. Consequently, they did not undertake to 
observe, respect or protect human rights identified in Article 55(c). Neither 
did the Charter define or list the rights and freedoms that are to be 
promoted.162 Despite the vagueness of human rights efforts in these 
provisions, they still had important consequences in that they 
internationalised the concept of human rights and provided the UN with the 
requisite legal authority to define and codify human rights.163 
 
While the UN Charter internationalised human rights, the 1948 Declaration 
of Human Rights (UDHR)164 has become the centrepiece for international 
human rights enumerating the basic rights of the individual. All states are 
deemed, by virtue of UN membership, to be bound by the UDHR – a 
situation prompting some states, particularly Asian, to call for its review.165 
The Universal Declaration is however not a treaty. It was adopted by the 
General Assembly in form of a resolution creating no real legal obligations 
and established no enforcement machinery. It was designed, as its preamble 
indicates, to provide “a common understanding” of the human rights and 
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fundamental freedoms referred to in the United Nations Charter.166 
Although the Universal Declaration is a non-binding instrument, few would 
deny that it nonetheless imposes some legal obligations. Whether all the 
rights it proclaims are binding and under what circumstances is debated. It 
can however be argued that the legal obligations which the Universal 
Declaration as a whole creates for governments derive from the duty the UN 
Charter imposes on them to “promote” human rights.167 
 
The second set of documents- the International Covenants on Human 
Rights- entered into force in 1976. Unlike the UDHR, they are legally 
binding instruments designed to transform the general principles proclaimed 
in the UDHR into binding treaty obligations.168 Together with the 
Covenants a number of international human rights treaties in a wide range 
of issue areas have emerged.  
 
4.2 INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHT REGIMES 
4.2.1. The United Nations Global Human Rights Regime 
 
The United Nations can be considered to be the global human rights regime. 
During the years after the adoption of the Universal Declaration there were 
two distinct developments taking place within or in relation to the UN 
framework that today in large make up the two monitoring arrangements- 
the Charter-based organs and the Treaty-based organs- this regime can 
adopt.169 The first, the Charter-based organs developed through ECOSOC 
resolutions 1235170 and 1503,171 have paved the way to an ever-growing 
institutional mechanism within the UN framework for dealing with human 
rights violations of various art and magnitude.  At the centre of today’s UN 
human rights regime is the UN Human Rights Council (which in 2006 
replaced the UN Commission on Human Rights). The Council’s special 
procedures enables mandate holders to examine, monitor, advise and 
publicly report on human rights situations in specific countries or territories. 
The revised Complaints Procedure mechanism allows individuals and 
organizations to bring complaints about human rights violations to the 
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attention of the Council. Furthermore, the Universal Periodic Review 
mechanism will assess the human rights situations in all 192 UN Member 
States. So far, a few ASEAN countries have undergone the Universal 
Periodic Review, but the Council has for example failed to address the 
current situation in Myanmar.  
  
The second development was the emergence of universal and regional 
treaty-based institutions for the protection of human rights. Today there are 
eight human rights treaty bodies (committees) that monitor implementation 
of the core international human rights treaties. The major difference 
between the various committees is the ability to treat individual 
communications and make on-site inquiry visits.172  In this regard, the 
committees to the CRC and the CEDAW, the two treaties that all ASEAN 
states have ratified, have limited powers. The committee to the CRC has no 
power to receive individual complaints or make inquiry visits. The 
committee to the CEDAW received such powers under the Optional 
Protocol. As we have seen, the problem with the treaty bodies is that many 
ASEAN Member States have not ratified the core treaties, and almost none 
have acceded to the Optional Protocols. Another problem is that even when 
states have ratified treaties, thus accepting them on a formal level, they still 
do not live up to the provisions or engage with the bodies, either as a result 
of lack of capacity or political will.173  
 
Conclusively, the different UN human right mechanisms in broad terms 
utilize mainly three methods to enforce protection of human rights. (1) 
Reporting procedures and on site visits which obliges state parties to report 
on their implementation and enables supervisory bodies to  evaluate their 
performance; (2) Inter-state procedures through which one state party may 
claim that another state party is not fulfilling its obligations; (3) Individual 
communications where an individual may submit that his rights has been 
violated.174 The UN human rights regime has filled an important role in 
developing and elaborating on the meaning of an ever-growing body of 
international human rights standards for the promotion and protection of 
human rights. However, the abilities of actual implementation and 
enforcement remain weak.175 Therefore, much of the work has been merely 
promotional, leaving the implementation and enforcement in the hands of 
the Member States. The reason for the rather weak enforcement and 
implementation is much due to that the organisation is a political body 
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composed of sovereign states with different interests.176 Submission to the 
regime is in large voluntary.  
 
4.2.2. Regional Human Rights Regimes 
 
The United Nations normative human rights framework has also played a 
crucial role in the establishment of regional human rights regimes. Foremost 
three regional human right regimes have developed in response to the 
difficulties to ensure effective protection and implementation of human 
rights; the European (centred on the Council of Europe and the European 
Court of Human Rights), the Inter-American (centred on the Organization of 
American States, the Inter American Commission of Human Rights and the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights) and the African system (centred on 
the African Union and the African Charter of Human and People’s 
Rights).177 
 
The legal origins for establishing human right regimes at the regional level 
remain a bit obscure and there are no set of international standards on how a 
regional human rights regime should be framed or designed. The UN 
Charter chapter VIII Article 52 for example makes provision for regional 
arrangements only in relations to peace and security, but it is silent as to 
human rights cooperation at that level.178 Yet Article 52 is the only 
provision that could be seen as providing support for regional arrangements. 
The Article refers to a union of states or an international organisation based 
upon a collective treaty or a constitution consistent with the purpose and 
principles of the UN Charter whose primary task is the maintenance of 
peace and security. Its members must be so closely interlinked in territorial 
terms that effective dispute settlement by means of specially provided 
procedure is possible.179 Examples include the Council of Europe, the OAS 
and the AU. Within ASEAN the TAC has previously provided such an 
example with dispute settlement stated in Articles 13-17.180 Today it is 
made up by the ASEAN Charter.  
 
Since the UN system has worldwide competence, one may legitimately ask 
why it has been possible, necessary or even desirable to arrange for human 
rights protection at the regional level as well. Regional approaches, many 
believed at the birth of the UN, may detract from the perceived universality 
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of human rights.181 In essence each regional human rights regime has 
originated from shared interest and demand for establishing a framework for 
human rights protection.182 The European system came into being as a 
natural reaction to a gross human rights violation during WWII and a 
defence against all forms of totalitarianism.183 The Inter-American regional 
human rights system was designed to be an ideological framework to make 
a coalition against communist threats and thought to be a springboard to 
defend effective political democracy in this region.184 Common interests 
also lay behind the creation of the African regional human rights regime; 
these were safeguarding independence, collective security, territory, 
integrity and promoting solidarity.185 It is obvious that regional cooperation 
originates from shared interests and collective vision to the solution of a 
problem, something that has in large been considered lacking in Southeast 
Asia.  
 
With time, opposition against regional arrangements cooled off and 
vanished. The 1993 Vienna Declaration provides an example of the changed 
attitude and highlighted the importance of regional arrangements in the 
promotion and protection of human rights.186 This is because regional 
human right regimes proved to hold a greater promise of effective protection 
of human rights. Why is this so? First, relatively high socioeconomic, 
political, cultural, shared judicial traditions and institutions are prerequisites 
for an effective human rights system. These requirements are more likely to 
be met at the regional level.  Second, states cannot be forced to submit 
themselves to a system. They will do so only if they have confidence in that 
system. This confidence is more likely to be attained if the system has been 
set up by a group of fairly likeminded countries, which are already 
cooperating through a regional organisation. Third, regional human right 
regimes are more likely to be able to exercise authority and apply pressure 
on states to redress violations. Recommendations are more likely to meet 
with less resistance. Fourth, publicity about human rights will be wider and 
more effective at the regional level.187  
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In essence, regional human right regimes exist in closer proximity to the 
people that needs to access them. Furthermore, where the global regime 
contain the minimum normative standards, the regional regimes can go 
further, add further rights, more stringent standards and operate within the 
needs, priorities and conditions of a specific region. Regional human right 
regimes are therefore more likely to be effective in implementing, applying 
and afford sanctions in defence of human rights.188  
 
Turning to Southeast Asia and ASEAN conclusively, a regional human 
rights regime in Southeast Asia can be considered important for several 
reasons. Most importantly, Southeast Asia remain a region where many 
human rights abuses are reported to occur and it is clear that the UN human 
rights framework falls short of affording necessary protection and 
implementation. A human rights regime within ASEAN thus has the ability 
to address human rights issues from the geographical, cultural and historical 
circumstances of it Member States. 
 
“Governments are going to be more responsive with a regional mechanism than they are in 
an international mechanism. I guess there is also the thought process of some of the 
governments in the region that the UN system is very western led.” (Interview with Ms. 
Kate Lappin, Regional Coordinator, Asia Pacific Forum on Women Law and Development 
(APWLD), Chiang Mai, Thailand).  
 
“At the practical level, the UN is just too far from our home […] There is also the issue 
that, there are issues that are much more pressing and hopefully would be given more space 
within a regional process than an international.” (Interview with Ms. Misun Woo, 
Programme Officer APWLD, Chiang Mai, Thailand). 
 
“There are several reasons [for an ASEAN human rights regime]. The first reason is that all 
these international conventions need to be domesticated. The first level of domestication is 
actually the national level and I would also think that the second level for domestication 
would be in the regional groupings. So therefore, in ASEAN you have a regional grouping 
which then essentially would promote human rights among its Member States [...] the 
second reason is that many people are not familiar with these international conventions so 
you need some kind of an advocacy. [...] I think advocacy is really a crucial part of the 
implementation” (Interview with Dr. Festo Kavishe, Deputy Regional Director, UNICEF, 
Bangkok, Thailand). 
 
“A lot of countries in ASEAN are not party to the core United Nations human rights 
treaties, and even Thailand, which is party to 8 major human right treaties has been 
reluctant to give UN treaty bodies jurisdiction over individual complaints – it is only party 
to the optional protocol of CEDAW [...] so in most cases  no complaints can actually go to 
those bodies. The ASEAN human rights mechanism is, at least, a way to start discussing 
human rights in an environment that is extremely sceptical to international obligations” 
(Interview with Ms. Erin Shaw, Regional Legal Advisor, Asia-Pacific Programme, 
International Commission of Jurists, Bangkok, Thailand). 
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4.2.3. Fundamental Principles for Regional Human Right 
Regimes 
 
The lack of clear standards for human rights cooperation at regional level 
does not necessarily mean that no principles from previous experiences may 
be detracted for what regional human rights regimes ought to look like. 
Dinah Shelton (2008) has for example observed some broad requirements 
for any human rights regime (not just regional ones). All human rights 
regimes that exist today consist of a few fundamental components. These 
are: (1) A list or lists of internationally guaranteed human rights and 
corresponding state duties; (2) Permanent institutions; (3) Compliance and 
enforcement procedures.189  
 
Some general principles may perhaps be detracted from international 
instruments. One example is the Declaration on Human Rights Defenders, 
adopted to address the rights and responsibilities of everyone, including 
states, individuals, groups and organs.190 The Declaration outlines some 
specific duties of States and the responsibilities of everyone with regard to 
defending human rights, in addition to explaining its relationship with 
national law.  Another example is of course the Principles Relating to the 
Status of National Institutions (The Paris Principles).191 Although the 
principles are focused on National human rights institutions, they contain 
some general principles that could serve as guidelines for what any kind of 
human rights body should look like and what functions it ought to be able to 
perform. These include, among other things, autonomy and independence 
from the Government, a capability of collectively promoting, protecting and 
monitoring the implementation of human rights. Furthermore, effective 
promotion and protection of human rights includes the capacity to hear and 
investigate complaints and transmit them to the competent authorities, 
reporting and making recommendations to the Government on human rights 
matters. Finally, there must be adequate financial support.192  
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4.2.3.1 Common Features among Regional Human Right Regimes 
The obvious source for normative standard is of course provided by drawing 
experience from already existing regional human right regimes. When the 
Asia-Pacific governments in 1990 carefully examined the three already 
existing human right regimes they concluded some fundamental aspects on 
which regional system differ from that of the UN. First, the extent to which 
they go further and adopt even more stringent standards then the 
international system. Second, the extent to which the standards and 
decisions are binding upon states or are merely persuasive. Third, the extent 
of limitations allowed in the interest of national security or in declarations 
of states of emergency, such as the European system’s power of judicial 
review to determine whether an emergency exists or not. Fourthly, what 
happens in conflict of national law and regional law, where usually, the 
latter would prevail. Last, the extent of access and ability for NGOs to 
provide their inputs. For Europe, the access of NGOs was most 
significant.193  
 
Despite their very different paths of development, the previously existing 
regional human right regimes share, albeit put in very general terms, some 
certain features in two main areas. First, is the organisational structure.  
The three regional human right regimes are all centred around a regional 
organisation that establish the general framework for the scope of their 
cooperation, including permanent institutions, conditions for membership 
and exclusion, rules for decision making and dispute settlement. Second, are 
the human rights protectional features. More specific human rights related 
features include a regional human rights instruments (charter) that reflect 
international standards; a commission with independent and impartial 
representatives mandated to do both promotional and protectional work, 
such as receive both inter-state and individual complaints; a court (in 
Europe the Commission and Court was merged and in Africa, the court is 
very new); full time secretariats; rules of procedure which include rules for 
interaction with both civil society and national human rights institutions, 
and cooperation with international human rights mechanisms.194  
 
Of course, the success of the European, the American and African human 
right regimes varies to a great extent. The state parties have steadily 
upgraded the different regimes’ scope and capacities in successive treaty 
revisions. Jack Donnelly (2007) has classified human right regimes into 
declaratory, promotional, implementation and enforcement regimes. All 
regimes, by definition, have standard norms, or at least guidelines. It is their 
capacities to monitor and/or enforce the norms that vary. Declaratory 
regimes have international norms but no international decision-making. 
Promotional regimes involve international exchange of information and 
efforts to promote the national implementation of norms. Implementation 
regimes involve monitoring procedures and policy coordination which are 
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weak and entirely under national control. Enforcement regimes involve 
binding international decision-making and strong international monitoring 
and compliance mechanisms.195  
 
Tracing the evolution of regimes back to the end of WWII Donnelly 
concludes that no international human right regimes existed. When the UN 
was established it was merely a declaratory regime. By 1965 it had turned to 
a strong declaratory regime, a promotional regime by 1975, and a strong 
promotional regime by 1985. With the fairly recently established UN 
Human Rights Council it may hopefully turn into something more. Among 
the regional regimes the European constituted the only enforcement regime 
by 1985. The Inter-American regime was only a declaratory regime in 1965 
but had become a strong promotional regime by 1985 and today constitutes 
an enforcement regime. The African regime began as a declaratory regime 
in the early 1980s. With the setting up of a court it may however 
transforming to something more.196  
 
4.2.4. Establishing Some General Standards for Regional Human 
Right Regimes 
 
Based on previous experiences, the UN have formulated some general 
principles (not legally binding instruments) on what regional human right 
regimes ought to be able to do in order to promote and protect human rights 
in accordance with human rights commitment of individual State Parties.197 
As a point of departure all regimes should be subsidiary to national human 
rights protection systems and not go below international human rights 
standards. A human rights regime shall furthermore have the mandates, 
responsibilities and structures in the following areas as a minimum:198 
 
4.2.4.1. Monitoring 
Every regional human rights regime should be able to monitor the general 
human rights situation and publish reports, which include recommendations 
for action at the regional level. A regime should be equipped with mandates 
to request State Parties to provide information in relation to promotion and 
protection of human rights, including information on specific human rights 
situations. Furthermore, a regional human rights regime should be able to 
carry out on site visits to State Parties to investigate specific human rights 
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concerns. The findings shall result in some sort of reports that are made 
public and widely circulated.199  
 
4.2.4.2. Communications 
Regional human right regimes shall also be able to receive, investigate, 
analyse and decide on communications from any person, group of persons 
or NGO alleging human rights violations by a State Party or from a State 
Party vis-à-vis another State Party. In the course of investigation, the regime 
shall be able to obtain all necessary information required. Where the 
mechanism finds that there has been a violation of human rights, 
recommendations shall be made to the specific State Party who must 
comply with the findings and report on the steps they have taken to give 
effect to the findings.200 Regional human rights regimes should furthermore 
always be secondary to national human rights protection. 
 
4.2.4.3. Capacity Building and Education 
Other important functions of a regional human right regime are to clarify the 
meaning of human rights standards, harmonize them and disseminate the 
information regionally. In doing so, there are a number of tools that can be 
used. On a very general level the regime should encourage ratification and 
accession to all core international human rights treaties including their 
optional protocols. The regional human rights regime should also be able to 
advice, and respond to request on advice from Member States, on national 
and regional policies and legislation to ensure harmonization and 
compliance with international human rights norms and standards. When it 
comes to cooperation and interaction, the regime should be able to cooperate 
and engage with state officials as well as civil society including NGOs and 
other institutions and contribute to human rights training programmes for 
everyone. Furthermore, a regional human rights regime should be able to 
develop wider public awareness and knowledge about human rights in the 
region. 201 
 
4.2.4.4. Composition  
The composition of the different mechanisms making up the regime is 
crucial for its effectiveness. The representatives must on the one hand be 
independent from their respective governments, and on the other, be 
impartial persons of integrity with recognized competence in the field of 
human rights. Representatives must be elected following a fair and 
transparent selection process at national level, which should include 
consultation with civil society. Membership of the regime shall reflect 
representation of geographical areas and aim to achieve gender balance. 
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Representatives shall also be accorded necessary privileges and immunities 
in order to carry out their work.202  
 
4.2.4.5. Support 
State Parties shall provide the regime with adequate resources and the 
authority to use these resources freely and independently, to properly fulfil 
its mandate. In this regard, the work of the representatives shall be 
supported by a secretariat.203  
 
4.2.5. Assessing Human Right Regimes 
 
How do we assess different human right regimes? The different criteria 
above undeniably provide a yardstick against which human rights 
cooperation can be measured, both from their organisational structure and 
from the human rights protectional features. Jack Donnelly (2007) has 
focused on the differences in regimes that arise from the source of their 
authority (based on a treaty or rooted in a wider international organisation), 
their range or focus, and the character of their powers. First, the organisation 
it structures around is essential because human rights institutions can either 
draw strength from the influence of the broader organisation or be victim to 
its politicization.204 Second, the different implementations and enforcement 
mechanisms the regime is equipped with together with its composition and 
funding gives indications if it has the necessary preconditions to have an 
effective impact on human rights. In examining the implementation and 
enforcement mechanisms, the principal tools available to various regimes 
are: (1) state reports; (2) information-advocacy procedures such as country 
rapporteurs; (3) individual and state complaints mechanisms.205  
 
4.3. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Against this background, a few general conclusions can be made. First, the 
UN framework initially only established an obligation to promote human 
rights. The UN human rights regime has revealed its limitations mainly 
when it comes to enforcing and implementing human rights since the notion 
of the sovereignty of the nation state is still very strong. Second, regional 
cooperation’s have proven much more effective in protecting human rights 
since they are closer to the people to be protected and can operate within the 
geographical, cultural and historical context. They also go further and 
complement rather than duplicate the work of the global UN human rights 
regime. While there are no real norms for establishing regional human right 
regimes, previous experiences has made it possible to establish some 
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general principles on what functions a regional human rights regime should 
be able to perform and what fundamental elements are required for a human 
rights regime to function effectively. Third, when assessing human right 
regimes, the type of organisation it is structured around and its institutions 
are of great importance. Similar, the tools of protection and implementation 
together with the composition and support of the regime provides criteria for 
measurement. Fourth, the evolution of human right regimes has been 
gradual displaying that even weak human right regimes can contribute to 
improve national practice, and subsequently, develop into stronger regimes 
over time.  
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CHAPTER V 
5. The ASEAN Human Rights Regime – Key 
Instruments and Structures 
The emerging ASEAN Human Rights Regime is structured around the 
institutional framework of ASEAN. It is made up by three core instruments; 
the ASEAN Charter, the Terms of Reference (ToR) to the AICHR, and the 
Terms of Reference to the ACWC.  To get a perception of the prospects for 
better protection of human rights these instruments will be examined here 
with the starting point in the ASEAN Charter. Like other ASEAN 
institutions, the commissions are an integrated part of ASEAN, the AICHR 
established within its Political-Security Pillar,206 the ACWC within its 
Socio-Cultural Pillar207, embedded in the diverse regional context laid out in 
previous chapters. The concluding part of the chapter will consider the 
regime against the core principles for regional human right regimes laid out 
in the previous chapter.  
 
5.1 THE ASEAN CHARTER 
5.1.1. Legal Implications 
 
The ASEAN Charter, which entered into force on December 15 2008, 
explicitly creates a legal and institutional framework with a legal personality 
for the Association. The overall purpose with the Charter is to make 
ASEAN a more rules-based organisation. As Tommy Koh pointed out “The 
ASEAN Way of relying on networking, consultation, mutual 
accommodation and consensus will not be done away with. It will be 
supplemented by a new culture of adherence to rules”208 Article 3 of the 
Charter certainly confirms this by stating: “ASEAN, as an inter-
governmental organisation, is hereby conferred legal personality”. With the 
1967 Bangkok Declaration as the only founding document, ASEAN has 
rested on somewhat uncertain legal grounds. In fact, the Bangkok 
Declaration has been considered a quite controversial document when it 
comes to the legal status of ASEAN, raising questions whether ASEAN 
could be regarded as an international entity at all.209  
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The fact that ASEAN now claims international legal personality in the 
Charter does not mean that it lacked such personality previously. ASEAN’s 
legal status can hardly be considered to have transformed over night from 
being just ten separate Member States hoping to promote regional stability 
and economic growth into a unified supranational entity.210 However, the 
more interesting question is, whether the presence of such provision now 
means that it possesses such personality with any new significant 
implications, especially when it comes to human rights?  
 
As chapter two laid out, ASEAN was never intended to become a 
supranational institution acting independently of its members, and it has 
clearly lacked the power to impose binding obligations on all its Member 
States. The mere fact that an organisation has legal status under international 
law may be more interesting from a legal theoretical standpoint than from a 
practical. In theory, legal status implies that the organisation possesses 
rights and duties enforceable by law and for example the capacity to 
conclude treaties, which is necessary for the exercise of their functions and 
the fulfilment of their purposes.211 Furthermore, as far as resolving disputes 
within the Charter, as a matter of treaty law, the principles enumerated in 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties will apply, as its principles 
are applicable as a matter of customary international law.212 In practice 
however, the legal status reveals nothing about what powers such entity may 
in fact exercise. In the Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the 
United Nations case213, the International Court of Justice has elaborated on 
this issue with regards to the legal status of the UN: 
 
“The Court has come to the conclusion that the Organization is an international person. 
That is not the same thing as saying that it is a State, which it certainly is not, or that its 
legal personality and rights and duties are the same as those of a State. Still less is it the 
same thing as saying that it is “a super-State”, whatever that expression may mean… 
Whereas a State possesses the totality of international rights and duties recognized by 
international law, the rights and duties of an entity such as the Organization must depend 
upon its purposes and functions as specified or implied in its constituent documents and 
developed in practice.”214 
 
In essence, the implications of the ASEAN Charter in terms of legal 
personality are limited because the scope of its cooperation will still be 
determined based on the willingness of the Member States to cede more 
power to its centre or to keep it as it has always been. The significance of 
the Charter lies in the fact that it does formalize the goals, purposes and 
principles of ASEAN that are legally binding on the Member States. Before, 
ASEAN has operated largely by what former Secretary General Rodolfo R. 
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Severino called oíd -, a Spanish speaking term for playing music by ear 
rather than following a score.215 In that sense, the Charter provides formal 
obligations, or a score, for the Member States. To many it also provides a 
sign of positive development that human rights at least now are on the 
agenda of ASEAN.  
 
“Within the ASEAN structure, now human rights are officially recognized as an agenda of 
ASEAN. This has never happened before. Previously human rights were like dirty words. 
You did not talk about human rights in the government meetings within ASEAN because it 
is a western value imported to undermine governments in the region, to topple 
governments. So it is that kind of negative perception on human rights. But now, quoted in 
the ASEAN Charter and even established institutions to address human rights issues. So no 
matter how flawed it is, this process, it is still a recognition officially and you can use this 
recognition and then the institutions to campaign and advocate for human rights to be 
implemented by governments” (Interview with Mr. Yap Swee Seng, Executive Director, 
Forum Asia, Bangkok, Thailand). 
 
While the purposes and principles contained in the ASEAN Charter may be 
considered essential in order for the organisation to pursue its purposes and 
obtain its goals, problem still remains in the fact that, first, it is up to the 
Member States to choose to abide by those principles. Second, if the 
purposes and principles are in contradiction to one another or if some 
purposes and principles are more important than others, the prospects for 
ASEAN to make any effective inroads into the development of human rights 
become difficult. 
 
5.1.2. Contents of the Charter 
 
In many ways and for obvious reasons, the ASEAN Charter simply 
reasserts, in legal form, what ASEAN has already become. It restates goals, 
principles and ideals already contained in previous ASEAN agreements.216 
The first and second purposes of the Charter are thus related to enhancing 
peace and security and economic cooperation as laid out in the 1967 
Bangkok Declaration.217  
 
In conducting inter-state relations, the ASEAN Charter’s first principles 
capture many of the traditional ASEAN norms established by the Treaty of 
Amity and Cooperation (TAC) and the ASEAN way of decision-making. In 
Article 2, the first principle that ASEAN and its Member States shall adhere 
to is the respect for independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity 
and national identity of all ASEAN Member States (Article 2.2 a) It is 
followed by the principles of non-interference in the internal affairs of the 
Member States (Article 2.2 e).  
 
At the same time, the ASEAN Charter’s 55 Articles formalizes some of the 
trends that have been visible in ASEAN development. First, the Charter 
codifies ASEAN’s objective and principles, which include norms of 
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behaviour not only for inter-state relations, but also between the state and its 
citizens. It articulates broad goals such as a commitment to become more 
peoples-oriented organisation; an ASEAN Community underpinned by the 
values of good governance, democracy and the rule of law. Its initial words: 
“WE, THE PEOPLES of the Member States of the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN)”218 makes a clear statement of this. It continues on 
the same path with the ASEAN peoples at the centre of the ASEAN 
community-building process; at least 10 of the 15 “purposes” of ASEAN are 
directly related to the peoples of ASEAN.219 It also introduces the concept 
of human rights in a binding legal document of ASEAN. 
 
Second, the Charter binds the Member States to a legalised framework and 
makes ASEAN more institutionalised. The ASEAN Summit for example 
becomes biannual rather than annual. It also establishes the Foreign 
Ministers Meeting as a Coordinating Council. Another distinct feature of the 
Charter is the creation of an ASEAN Community that rests on three pillars; 
the Security Community, the Economic Community and, the Socio-Cultural 
Community.220 The AICHR and the ACWC find themselves under the 
Security Community and Socio-Cultural Community respectively.  
 
5.1.3. Key Institutions 
 
To discern a clear picture on ASEAN’s institutional structures and their 
respective functions from the Charter is quite hard. The ASEAN 
institutional system set out in the Charter incorporates key existing 
institutions, while creating new structures which are being phased in to 
ASEAN’s operations. In general terms however, the Association remains 
very state-centric with little engagement and insight from CSOs and lack of 
representation through for example a peoples represented assembly.  
 
The main organs are provided in Chapter IV of the Charter:  
 
- The ASEAN Summit (Article 7) 
- The ASEAN Coordinating Council (Article 8) 
- ASEAN Community Councils (Article 9) 
- ASEAN Sectoral Ministerial Bodies (Article 10) 
- Secretary General of ASEAN and ASEAN Secretariat (Article 11) 
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- Committee of Permanent Representatives to ASEAN (Article 12) 
- ASEAN National Secretariats (Article 13) 
- ASEAN Human Rights Body (Article 14) 
- ASEAN Foundation (Article 15) 
 
The following will give a brief description of a few of these organs. 
 
5.1.3.1. The ASEAN Summit. 
The ASEAN Summit is the supreme policy making body of ASEAN and 
comprises the heads of government of the ten Member States.  As the 
highest level of authority in ASEAN, the Summit sets the direction for 
ASEAN policies and objectives. It signs or endorses agreements, and the 
issuance of declarations. The Summit authorizes the establishment or 
dissolution of ASEAN sectoral bodies for specific areas of cooperation. The 
Summit also functions as final decision-making body in matters referred to 
it by ASEAN ministerial bodies or the Secretary-General, and plays the role 
of an appellate body for disputes and cases of non-compliance that cannot 
be resolved by ASEAN’s dispute settlement mechanisms.  Under the 
Charter, the Summit meets twice a year. 
 
5.1.3.2. ASEAN Ministerial Councils 
The Charter established four important new Ministerial bodies to support 
the Summit.  They are the ASEAN Coordinating Council to support the 
ASEAN Summit’s meetings and to oversee overall implementation and 
coordination in the ASEAN Community, the ASEAN Political-Security 
Community Council, ASEAN Economic Community Council, and ASEAN 
Socio-Cultural Community Council to ensure coordination of the activities 
under each of the three areas. Together, the Councils supervise the sectoral 
activities of ASEAN. 
  
5.1.3.3. ASEAN Secretariat and Secretary General 
Administrative support for ASEAN’s official activities is provided by the 
ASEAN Secretariat, which was established in 1976. The Secretariat is 
headed by the ASEAN Secretary-General, and staffed by nationals from 
ASEAN member states and located in Jakarta. The Secretariat is also 
responsible for monitoring implementation of ASEAN commitments and 
maintaining the organisation’s official records. 
 
5.1.3.4. Committee of Permanent Representatives  
For the day-to-day working level coordination of ASEAN activities, the 
Charter established a Committee of Permanent Representatives (CPR) in 
Jakarta, comprising ambassadorial-level representatives from the member 
states. The CPR will take over the work of the ASEAN Standing 
56 
 
Committee, which was established in 1967 to perform the coordinating role 
for ASEAN. 
 
5.1.4. Decision Making and Dispute Settlement 
 
The decision-making procedure prescribed in chapter VII of the Charter is 
still based on the basic principles of consultation and consensus that clearly 
reflects the traditional ASEAN Way (Article 20.1). In the absence of 
consensus, “the ASEAN Summit may decide how a specific decision can be 
made” (Article 20.2). The implications of this are certainly unclear, given 
that the Summit itself uses consensus based decision-making. The question 
of Myanmar has for example always been pressing and ASEAN’s inability 
to deal with the country in a more firm way display an inability of the 
Association to act. While the formulation in the provision may open up the 
room for interpretation and measures of flexibility in decision-making on 
sensitive issues, it is still very vague.  
 
If a dispute arises Chapter VIII of the Charter is applicable. The starting 
point is Article 22(1), which states that “Member States shall endeavour to 
resolve peacefully all disputes in a timely manner through dialogue, 
consultation and negotiation”. However, Article 22(2) further requires that 
“ASEAN shall maintain and establish dispute settlement mechanisms in all 
fields of ASEAN cooperation”. If a dispute remains unresolved it shall be 
referred to the ASEAN Summit for decision under Article 26.   
 
Would a dispute arise on how a provision, or any other provision, should be 
interpreted, the interpretation of the Charter shall be undertaken by the 
ASEAN Secretariat in accordance with the rules of procedure determined by 
the ASEAN Coordinating Council (Article 51). Any dispute with regards to 
interpretation shall be settled in accordance with the dispute settlement 
provisions in chapter VIII.   
 
In large, Chapter VIII of the Charter reveals the lack of a clear enforcement 
mechanism and that there is no provision for suspension or expulsion of 
members that do not comply with the Charter. The Charter only states that: 
“in the case of a serious breach of the Charter or non-compliance, the matter 
shall be referred to the ASEAN Summit for decision” (Article 20.4). Again, 
since the Summit is consensus driven it raises the question whether 
decisions could be taken against a state without consensus. This of course 
undermines the significance of other provisions, not at least when it comes 
to the ones dealing with human rights. 
 
5.1.5. The ASEAN Charter and Human Rights 
 
The ASEAN Charter is obviously no human rights instrument and does not 
refer to any international human rights standards, for example the Universal 
Declaration (UDHR). However, it brings forward the principles to 
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strengthen democracy, human rights and the rule of law. The Charter further 
includes references to human rights in three different places, as follows: 
 
1. ASEAN will adhere “to the principles of democracy, the rule of law and good 
governance, respect for and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms”. 
(Preamble) 
 
2. Out of the purposes of ASEAN, the seventh is ”to strengthen democracy, enhance good 
governance and the rule of law, and to promote and protect human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, with due regard to the rights and responsibilities of the Member States of 
ASEAN”. (Article 1 p.7, Purposes) 
 
3. Out of the principles, ASEAN and the Member States shall act in accordance with 
“respect for fundamental freedoms, the promotion and protection of human rights, and the 
promotion of justice (Article 2 (i), Principles) 
 
These provisions are quite remarkable since they explicitly recognise rights 
and freedoms for individuals, protection for people and democratic forms of 
government. As shown in chapter three, the 1967 Bangkok Declaration 
already did include the words “respect for justice and the rule of law” 
(emphasis added), but this was merely “in the relationship among countries 
of the region”.221 This new undertaking to promote and protect human rights 
and fundamental freedoms, provided by the Charter, signals, if only on 
paper, that the ASEAN countries acknowledge that such concepts are 
important. It further supports that the Asian values debate has lost some of 
its credibility and that ASEAN is turning from being an organisation merely 
focused on the cooperation between states, to taking the rights of individuals 
more seriously.  
 
The above provisions are however flanked with more traditional principles 
emphasising “independence, sovereignty, non-interference in internal 
affairs’ and ‘respect for the right of every Member State to lead its national 
existence free from external interference, subversion and coercion”. 
Considering how prominent these principles have been in the cooperation 
between the Member States of ASEAN, the language of the Charter can be 
considered ambiguous. With the introduction of human rights in the 
ASEAN Charter, some argue that the Charter can even be considered to 
promote two opposite sets of incompatible norms.222 While, the Charter 
does not explicitly subjugate its human rights provisions to those on national 
sovereignty or non-interference,223 the human rights provisions are however 
found beneath these norms indicating that they may be of less importance.  
 
5.1.5.1. A Human Rights Body 
Since human rights traditionally have been outside the ASEAN agenda one 
of the most sensitive issues was the drafting of the enabling provision 
                                               
221
 1967 Bangkok Declaration, Established on August 8, 1967, Article 2. Available at: 
<http://www.aseansec.org/1212.htm>  (Accessed on May 17, 2011).See also chapter 3.1. 
222
 David Martin Jones, supra note 92, p. 737.  
223
 Yuval Ginbar, supra note 156,  p. 513.  
58 
 
pertaining to the establishment of an “ASEAN Human Rights Body.”224 The 
Charter provides for the establishment of the ASEAN human rights body in 
Article 14 stating:  
 
1. In conformity with the purposes and principles of the ASEAN Charter relating to the 
promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, ASEAN shall 
establish an ASEAN human rights body. 
 
2. This ASEAN human rights body shall operate in accordance with the terms of reference 
to be determined by the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting. 
 
Any further precision in the Charter on how this human rights body should 
be structured is not provided. However, since the body’s structure was to be 
decided by the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting it was no surprise that 
the shape of this body would be the result of the ASEAN Way of decision 
making and the ToR the product of stiff political negotiation and 
compromises amongst its Member States.  
 
5.1.6. Norms of Non-Interference and Consensus – Much Ado 
about Nothing? 
 
The Charter has received a wide range of criticism that it is inadequate to 
bring about any real changes. First, it merely captures ASEAN’s existing 
principles and agreements already developed and in force over the last four 
decades with the core principle of non-interference. Second, procedurally, it 
provides that decision-making in ASEAN shall be based on consultation and 
consensus without any real dispute settling mechanism. The principles of 
non-interference and consensus remain central and have also been echoed in 
the ToRs to the two human rights bodies.  
 
The principle of non-interference is hardly something unique to ASEAN, 
but finds prominent places in other organisational structures as well, most 
notably other regional human right regimes organisations such as the OAS 
and the AU.225 While the principle of non-interference remains strong in 
other regional human right regimes, they have been able to consolidate it, at 
least to some extent, with the abilities of human rights organs to scrutinize 
and render binding decisions. So in principle at least, there does not have to 
be a complete contradiction between accepting, by the political will of a 
state, the decisions of an international body and the principle of non-
interference. However, when it comes to ASEAN, it is obvious that the 
principle is interpreted and applied quite rigidly, especially when it comes to 
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human rights. This is one of the major reasons why pushing human rights 
under ASEAN has been a very difficult process.226 
 
Similarly, the principle of consensus-based decision-making is hardly 
controversial. Of course, such a principle is needed, because without a 
shared view on principles and values, no regional cooperation would be able 
to take place in Southeast Asia or anywhere else for that matter.  
 
“What is the problem with consensus? Even the development of the international 
conventions was actually achieved through consensus. That is actually how the UN 
normally works, bringing all of the parties together and then (...) on the basis of a consensus 
you find a way of monitoring. So I think consensus on its own should not be seen as 
something that is bad because without a consensus (...) you will not really be able to move 
forward” (Interview with Dr. Festo Kavishe, Deputy Regional Director, UNICEF, 
Bangkok, Thailand.). 
 
Yet, the problem lies in the fact that within ASEAN, as showed above, 
every single important decisions needs to be taken by consensus. No lower 
standard exists - no two-thirds majority or simple majority is prescribed in 
cases where consensus cannot be reached. In short, the Southeast Asian 
‘culture’ of dealing with one another- the ASEAN Way227- will make it very 
difficult to move forward in sensitive issues such as human rights. 
 
Criticism thus seems justified. Yet, it might be considered unrealistic to 
think that the Charter would reflect anything other than the prevailing 
regional realities. As Tan Sir Dato, Malaysia’s representative on the High 
Level Task Force (HLTF) to draft the Charter, states: “No Charter can be 
perfect. The language in the Charter too can never be simpler or clearer. 
Any resemblance of ambiguity that exists is creatively intended to achieve 
consensus, which can only be understood and appreciated within ASEAN. 
The Charter is also as bold and as visionary as it can be as to ensure 
compliance. Pragmatism, ultimately is the key word”.228 Obviously, the 
Charter represents the lowest common denominator that the Member States 
could realistically agree upon.  
 
5.2. THE ASEAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSIONS – THE AICHR 
AND ACWC 
5.2.1. The Terms of Reference of the AICHR 
 
As the name indicates, and as Article 3 of the ToR explicitly spells out, “the 
AICHR is an inter-governmental body and an integral part of the ASEAN 
organisational structure. It is a consultative body.” The mandate for its 
establishment derives directly from the ASEAN Charter (Article 14). Like 
all other ASEAN organs or bodies, the AICHR shall operate through 
                                               
226
 Hao Duy Phan, supra note 11.  
227
 See chapter 3.1.1.2. 
228
 Tan Sri Dato, ‘Facing Unfair Criticisms’ in Tommy Koh et. al. (ed.), The Making of the 
ASEAN Charter (World Scientific Publishing, Singapore, 2009), p.25. 
60 
 
consultation and consensus, with firm respect for sovereign equality of all 
Member States. Article 2.4 of the ToR also underlines that the AICHR shall 
have a constructive and non-confrontational approach and cooperation to 
enhance promotion and protection of human rights.  
 
The purposes of the Commission are provided in Article 1. The first is “to 
promote and protect human rights and the fundamental freedoms of the 
peoples of ASEAN”(Article 1.1) Article 1.3 makes reference to the ASEAN 
Charter by stating that the purpose of the Commission is “to contribute to 
the realisation of the purposes of ASEAN as set out in the Charter [...]”. 
Article 1.4 reaffirms the relativist standpoint, or situational uniqueness, 
towards human rights articulated in the Bangkok Declaration during the 
1993 Vienna World Conference on Human Rights by emphasising on the 
“national and regional particularities and mutual respect for different 
historical, cultural and religious backgrounds, and taking into account the 
balance between rights and responsibilities”.229 Furthermore, Article 1.6 
makes references to uphold international human rights standards proscribed 
by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Vienna Declaration and 
Programme of Action and international human rights instruments to which 
ASEAN Member States are parties.  
 
The AICHR is set out to respect the principles provided in Article 2 of the 
ToR. This provision first of all makes an overall reference that the AICHR 
shall respect the principles found in Article 2 of the ASEAN Charter. It 
further precise which of these principles should be respected more in 
particular. Just like the Charter, the ToR captures the ASEAN fundamental 
norms laid out in the TAC and manifested through the ASEAN Way. The 
first principles underline the respect for independence, sovereignty, equality 
and non-interference followed by the respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms. (Article 2.1 a-g).  
 
5.2.1.1. Composition of the AICHR 
The composition of the AICHR is set out in Article 5 of the ToR. The 
Commission is comprised of ten representatives, one from each Member 
State of ASEAN. Each will serve a three-year term and may be 
consecutively re-appointed for only one more term. The representatives are 
required to act impartially in accordance with the ASEAN Charter and the 
ToR (Article 5.7). However, the representatives are not independent, but 
appointed by- and accountable to their respective governments. Each 
appointing government may also decide, at its own discretion, to replace its 
representative (Article 5.2 and 5.6)  
 
As for decision-making, the Commissions decisions shall be based on 
consultation and consensus in accordance with Article 20 of the ASEAN 
Charter (ToR Article 6.1). Such an arrangement means that each state would 
be able to reject any criticism of its own human rights record by veto. 
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Clearly, this could either lead to hampered progress or to the adoption of 
weak positions based on the lowest common denominator.230 
 
The ToR stipulates that AICHR shall respect for international human rights 
principles, including universality, indivisibility, interdependence and 
interrelatedness of all human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as 
impartiality, objectivity, non-selectivity, non-discrimination, and avoidance 
of double standards and politicisation (Article 2.2) At the same time it also 
makes clear that the primary responsibility to promote and protect human 
rights rests with each Member State (Article 2.3). 
 
5.2.1.2. Mandates of the AICHR 
While there is no closer definition on what a consultative mandate exactly 
encapsulates, in more general terms it can be defined in three different 
ways:231 
 
1. First, under the United Nations’ protocol, an organisation with 
consultative status is listed and able to deliver oral and written 
reports. It can also make complaints. 
2. Second, a more general definition implies that a consultative body 
can make recommendations and be consulted. 
3. Third, a consultative body needs to consult and gain consensus 
between its members when making a decision.  
 
Even though consultative is not further defined in the ToR, as an integral 
part of ASEAN with the ASEAN Way consensus bases decision-making 
process, the third option seems to be the closest to a correct definition. 
However, the explicit mandates and functions of the AICHR, proscribed in 
Article 4 of the ToR, reveals more in detail what this commission is 
empowered to do. There are 14 mandates in total and the AICHR’s 
functions can be summarized as follows: 
 
1. Develop strategies for the promotion and protection of human rights. 
2. Develop an ASEAN Human Rights Declaration. 
3. Raise awareness of human rights amongst the peoples. 
4. Promote capacity building for the effective implementation of 
human rights. 
5. Encourage ASEAN Member States to consider acceding to and 
ratify international human rights instruments. 
6. Promote the full implementation of ASEAN instruments related to 
human rights. 
7. Provide advisory services on human rights matters to ASEAN 
sectoral bodies upon request. 
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8. Engage in a dialogue and consultation with other ASEAN and other 
entities associated to ASEAN including civil society. 
9. Consult with other national, regional and international institutions 
and entities concerned with the promotion and protection of human 
rights. 
10. Obtain information from ASEAN Member States on the promotion 
and protection of human rights. 
11. Develop common approaches and positions on human rights matters 
of interest to ASEAN. 
12. Prepare studies on thematic issues on human rights.  
13. Submit an annual report on the Commission’s activities to the 
ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting.  
14. Perform any other tasks as may be assigned to it by the ASEAN 
Foreign Ministers Meeting.  
 
Only three mandates (1, 9 and 10) actually include the word protection, but 
more importantly most of the mandates are focused with promoting, 
encouraging, advising, awareness raising etc, which makes it clear that the 
AICHR will be more, focused on the areas of promotion rather than 
protection of human rights. Strikingly visible is the lack of authority for the 
AICHR to issue binding decisions, receive complaints, consider cases, or 
conduct investigative visits. It is also clear that there is a strong 
interconnection with the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting and thus the 
Member States.  
 
5.2.2. The Terms of Reference of the ACWC 
 
The ASEAN Commission on Women and Children was established through 
a different route than the AICHR that could be described as a much shorter 
and smoother one. This is due mainly to the fact that all ASEAN member 
states are already parties to the two relevant UN treaties CEDAW and CRC 
(see chapter 2), but also to its establishment following closely that of the 
AICHR, in time, process and to a large extent in substance.232 Unlike the 
AICHR, which is established through the legally binding ASEAN Charter 
and placed under the political-security pillar, the ACWC is created under the 
non-legally binding 2004 Vientiane Action Plan (VAP) and placed under 
the socio-cultural pillar which blueprint has replaced the VAP and is not a 
legally binding instrument.233 The reason for this is unclear and such a 
solution may imply that the ACWC is weaker from a legal perspective. At 
the same time, it may also imply that the protection of children and women 
are considered to be “softer” human rights, ones that can easier be discussed 
and decided upon. 
 
There is much resemblance in the ToR of the ACWC to that of the AICHR. 
The ACWC is also limited to being an inter-governmental body and an 
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integral part of ASEAN. It is a consultative body (Article 4). Its decision-
making shall be based on consensus in accordance with the ASEAN Charter 
(Article 7). Likewise, while the representatives shall act impartially, they are 
at the same time accountable to their respective governments who may 
decide to replace the representative. Its mandates, prescribed in Article 5 
are, similar to the AICHR, also limited to mainly promotion.  
 
A distinct difference however is that the ACWC is more specific in what is 
set out to do and in the fact that it rests on solid legal grounds of treaty 
obligations, the CEDAW and the CRC. In that sense it holds greater 
promise since more consensus exist on these issues, something also 
displayed by previous declarations on these issues in ASEAN.234 Many 
references are also made to these two instruments, both in the purposes 
(Article 2.5), principles (Article 3.2 and 3.4) and in the specific mandates 
and functions of the ACWC (Article 5.7 and 5.11).  The ACWC has 16 
explicit mandates set out in Article 5 of the ToR. These include assisting 
Member States who so request in writing reports to UN human rights 
bodies; similarly assisting member states in implementing the concluding 
observations of the CEDAW and CRC committees; and ‘to enhance the 
effective implementation of CEDAW and CRC through, among others, 
exchange of visits, seminars and conferences’. The ToR also emphasises 
that the ACWC is “[t]o complement, rather than duplicate, the function of 
CEDAW and CRC Committees”. Unlike the AICHR the ACWC is not 
required to submit annual reports to the Foreign Ministers Meeting, but to 
the lower level ASEAN Ministerial Meetings.  
 
5.2.3. The Relationship Between the two Commissions 
 
How these two bodies can work in coordination and collaboration is not 
clear. The ToR to the AICHR reveals that the AICHR is the overarching 
human rights body (Article 6.6) As such Article 6.9 further requires: 
 
“The AICHR shall work with all ASEAN sectoral bodies dealing with human rights to 
expeditiously determine the modalities for their ultimate alignment with the AICHR. To 
this end, the AICHR shall closely consult, coordinate and collaborate with such bodies in 
order to promote synergy and coherence in ASEAN’s promotion and protection of human 
rights.” 
 
However, how such alignment should be framed is at the time of writing yet 
to be determined.   
 
5.2.4. Support of the ASEAN Human Rights Regime 
 
There are no clear indications from either the ASEAN Charter or the ToRs 
how much will be spent to support these commissions. ASEAN currently 
has to contend with the USD 904 000 of annual contribution from each 
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Member State for its operating budget and whatever additional funds 
voluntary contributed towards the ASEAN Development Fund.235 In 
establishing the AICHR, each Member State contributed USD 20,000 as a 
seed fund for the operation of AICHR. 236 No parallel figures have been 
found for the ACWC.  
 
Relative to the three other regional human rights systems, ASEAN’s total 
budget as well as the budget for the AICHR is comparatively very small. As 
a comparison, the Council of Europe total budget for 2011 amounted to 
€217 million237; the Organisation of American State’s total budget for 2011 
amounted to USD 85 million238; the African Union’s total budget for 2009 
amounted to USD 162 million.239 Thus, the financial support given to the 
ASEAN human rights regime can be considered nothing else but inadequate 
when taking into account the human rights situation in the region that needs 
to be addressed by the commissions. The insufficient funding can only be 
explained by a lack of intention to truly provide the commissions with 
enough resources as to enable them to perform any serious work. It provides 
yet another question mark as to whether the Member States of ASEAN are 
truly committed to establishing a fully functional human rights regime. 
 
When it comes to secretarial support, the AICHR does not have an 
independent secretariat but is supported by the ASEAN Secretariat, more 
specifically by the Director-General of the Political Security Community of 
ASEAN and its team. A new position, the Assistant Director for the 
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights was created in 2010 within 
ASEAN Secretariat to support the work AICHR. However, it must be noted 
that the whole team, including the Assistant Director for the Promotion and 
Protection of Human Rights, is not responsible only for AICHR, but a 
whole range of issues and institutions under the Political and Security 
Community of ASEAN.240 
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5.3 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
From this overview of the ASEAN human rights regime, some general 
remarks can be made. First, when it comes to organisational structure, the 
ASEAN Charter does make ASEAN a more rules-based, institutionalized 
organisation, rerouting it somewhat from the ASEAN Way. The 
introduction of human rights in the Charter is clearly a significant 
development, as Vitit Muntarbhorn held, in the way that: 
 
“At the regional level, the ASEAN Charter is the first instrument, a treaty legally binding 
on all ten countries that involves human rights expressly as a permeated principle binding 
to everyone under the sun in ASEAN, including its leaders.”241 
 
However, at the same time many of ASEAN’s core norms and principles 
remain unchanged. The institutions reveal that ASEAN sill is a very state-
centric Association without any representation from civil society through for 
example an assembly. Furthermore, the core principles of non-interference 
and consensus remain at the centre of ASEAN’s normative framework.  
 
“[The ASEAN Charter] is the beginning of creation of new norms, [...] but then you have 
the concept of how does that work with non-interference and of course that is the very 
critical key dialectic between this emerging human rights architecture and traditions of the 
past.” (Interview with Melinda MacDonald, Program Manager South East Asian Regional 
Cooperation in Human Development Project (SEARCH), Bangkok, Thailand). 
 
Without any clear provisions on how agreements should be met when 
consensus is lacking, or how to settle disputes in the case of a serious breach 
of the Charter, or how to expel Members for not complying with the 
provisions, makes the organisational structure weak when it comes to 
upholding principles of human rights.  
 
What the inclusion of human rights on the ASEAN agenda further entails is 
also far from certain, considering that the ASEAN human rights regime is 
framed around a very politicized organisation, dominated by sovereign 
Member States with mainly poor human rights records. Obviously, this has 
been reflected on the two human rights commissions: 
 
“We were part of the drafting of the ToR, both of the AICHR and the ACWC, and we saw 
that it was watered down a lot” (Interview with Ms. Misun Woo, Programme Officer, 
APWLD, Chiang Mai, Thailand).  
 
That the core principles of non-interference and consensus have remained so 
strong within ASEAN implies that the ASEAN human rights regime is 
drafted with ambiguous language, which reinforces the ambivalent human 
rights stance. How shall for example the AICHR “contribute to the 
realisation of the purposes of ASEAN as set out in the ASEAN Charter in 
order to promote stability and harmony in the region, friendship and 
cooperation among ASEAN” (Article 1.3) when the purposes, on the one 
hand, is “to promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms of 
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the peoples of ASEAN” (Article 1.1), and on the other, “to  respect the 
principles of ASEAN as embodied in Article 2 of the ASEAN Charter, in 
particular: a) respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial 
integrity and national identity of all ASEAN Member States”?  
 
Second, the human right features also display some essential shortcomings 
in the human rights regime. Although it is clear that the commissions will be 
subsidiary and that the purpose is to uphold international standards, it is still 
the action of the commissions that will determine if they are actually able to 
do so. In terms of the specific mandates vested in the commissions they 
reveal that the ability to monitor and protect human rights is very limited. 
Strikingly visible is the lack of explicit authority for the commissions to 
issue binding decisions, receive complaints, consider cases, or conduct 
investigative visits. The focus is more on capacity building and educational 
measures. Another shortcoming is that the composition of the commissions 
and the independence of the representatives can be questioned. Finally the 
limited financial support shows that ASEAN provides a very limited 
organisational framework to establish a human rights regime under, at least 
comparative to other regional organisations. With a limited support from the 
secretariat, the conclusion is that the ASEAN human rights regime so far 
rates poor against international standards.  
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CHAPTER VI 
6. Effective Promotion and Protection of Human Rights 
within ASEAN? 
Southeast Asia continues to be a region where many human rights abuses 
occur, be they national or trans-national.242 The ASEAN human rights 
regime is supposed to play an important role of human rights development 
in the region from the standpoint of ASEAN. After all, the very essence of 
creating a human rights regime, as someone so nicely put it, “is to protect 
the human rights of the people.”243  But what are the prospects of the 
ASEAN human rights regime to actually have any effective impact, to bring 
about any changes and improve human rights? As the previous chapter 
displayed, the initial perception of the ASEAN human rights regime is that 
it rates poorly against international standards. This chapter will however 
give a closer examination of some of the mandates given to the AICHR and 
the ACWC to see what potential impact they can have on engendering the 
human rights situation in the Member States. This is followed by a review 
of some of the main challenges to the new human rights regime. The chapter 
ends with some brief recommendations.    
 
6.1 IMPLEMENTING THE MANDATES OF THE TWO 
COMMISSIONS 
6.1.1. Some Limitations to Keep in Mind when Assessing the 
Potentials of the Commissions 
 
There are a few factors that need to be taken into consideration when 
assessing the effectiveness of the ASEAN human rights regime. First, only a 
short period of time has elapsed since the establishment of the AICHR and 
even less since the establishment of the ACWC, wherefore no real 
accomplishments can measure their performance.  
 
Second, neither the AICHR nor the ACWC are mandated to receive and 
investigate individual complaints of human rights violations; their 
respective roles and mandates are, as the previous chapter laid out, much 
more limited than that. There have been 16 cases of human rights violations 
submitted to the AICHR. The cases submitted concern the following issues: 
 
Issues Number of Cases Concerned Countries 
Migrant workers 9 Indonesia 
Press freedom and freedom 
of expression 
2 Indonesia 
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Past human rights violations 
on crimes against humanity 
3 Indonesia 
Killings in Maguindanao 1 Philippines 
Women’s rights 1 Indonesia 
Death Penalty 1 Singapore/Malaysia 
Total 16  
Source: SAPA-Task Force on ASEAN and Human Rights, ‘Hiding behind Its Limits: A 
Performance Report on the first year of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on 
Human Rights’ pp. 12-13, Available at: <http://forum-asia.org/2010/AICHR@1_web.pdf >  
(Accessed on May 21, 2011). 
 
During the meeting of the AICHR in March 2010, civil society organisation 
who made the submissions were informed that the Commission was not able 
to receive these cases on the grounds that the Commission has yet to adopt 
the Rules of Procedure on how to handle cases of human rights violations 
submitted to them.244 This is of course a huge shortcoming in itself. 
 
Third, there is no ASEAN human rights instrument. In Europe, the 
Americas and Africa, the courts and commissions have substantive rights to 
implement through their respective human rights conventions. An essential, 
or at least highly desirable, pre-requisite, is that there exist a human rights 
instrument for ASEAN to define what it means with human rights. The 
AICHR is mandated to draft an ASEAN Human Rights Declaration under 
Article 4.2 of its ToR. The Commission is however still discussing the terms 
of reference of the drafting team and its processes and there is little 
information available to the public on this issue.245 
 
6.1.2. Using Limited Mandates to the Widest Extent Possible 
 
The potential possibility of the mandates derives from the legal obligations 
in the ASEAN Charter where the Member States in both the purposes and 
principles, among other things, have undertaken to promote and protect 
human rights. The terms ‘promotion and protection’ commonly appear in 
the same order and together in human rights instruments.246  The terms are 
similarly used simultaneously and appear 13 times together throughout the 
ToR of the AICHR. They inevitably raise the difficult questions, what do 
they imply, and whether one can exist without the other? Recalling the 
obligations arising under the UN Charter foremost to promote human rights, 
                                               
244
 SAPA-Task Force, supra note 236, p. 13. 
245
 Ibid,  p. 12. 
246
 Principles relating to the Status of National Institutions (The Paris Principles). See 
Article 1. Available at: <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/parisprinciples.htm> 
Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society 
to Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(Declaration on Human Right Defenders) See preamble and Article 2. Available at: 
<http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/defenders/declaration.htm> The Declaration is not, 
in itself, a legally binding instrument. However, it contains a series of principles and rights 
that are based on human rights standards enshrined in other international instruments that 
are legally binding – such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
Moreover, the Declaration was adopted by consensus by the General Assembly and 
therefore represents a very strong commitment by States to its implementation. 
69 
 
a state could not be considered to promote human rights if it was at the same 
time violating them.247 Through the ASEAN Charter the Member States 
have taken upon themselves to uphold the UN Charter, but without any 
references to any other international human rights instruments the legal 
obligation is a rather weak and undefined one. However, one can argue that 
at least in spirit, the Member States should be obligated to adopt the 
necessary tools to both promote and protect human rights to remain true to 
the ASEAN Charter and not go below international standards.  
 
At the same time, such language is too ambiguous and weak to really imply 
anything. It is rather the mandates vested in the AICHR and ACWC that 
will ultimately determine the scope of their abilities. Previous chapter 
revealed that the mandates are relatively weak. The lack of a clear 
complaints mechanism and with a language that adopts a formula of 
promotion first and protection later, the mandates display the lack of 
political will to adopt a strong regime.  
 
However, there are a few factors that open possibilities for a more effective 
human rights regime. First, some of the mandates are constructed quite 
openly, opening up for wide interpretation and the possibility to create 
stronger protectional mechanisms. Second, the mandates call for more 
inclusiveness of civil society, something that so far to a large extent has 
been lacking and which is important as checks and balance of the regime. 
Third, the mandates call for ratification of core international human rights 
treaties, which is an essential first step to be in conformity of international 
human rights standards and to further implement human rights. Finally, 
ASEAN has adopted an evolutionary approach to the development of 
human rights in the region. Both the ASEAN Charter and the ToRs of the 
AICHR and ACWC shall be reviewed after five years, which enables for 
amendments and improvements.248 Establishing a human rights regime does 
not happen overnight wherefore such considerations are important.     
 
6.1.3. The Formulation of the Mandates Opens up Possibilities 
for Wide Interpretation 
 
There are a few Articles in the respective ToRs that have been constructed 
quite openly thus opening up for the possibility to expand the scope of 
possibilities for the two human rights commissions. The mandates of the 
commissions could therefore have the potential to be strong if used wisely 
and interpreted widely to tackle sensitive issues in the region. As Vitit 
Muntarbhorn underlined: “what is not forbidden is not prohibited under the 
ToR”.249  
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6.1.3.1 The Mandates of the AICHR 
First, Article 4.1 provides an example of such an openly formulated Article 
and is perhaps the strongest provision in this sense. 
 
“The first mandate (Article 4.1) is a broad mandate that can actually include so many 
things. If the commission has the political will they can develop protection mechanisms like 
country visits to investigate, to do detention centre visits and to receive complaints” 
(Interview with Mr. Yap Swee Seng, Executive Director, Forum Asia, Bangkok, Thailand). 
 
Article 4.1 states that the AICHR has the mandate “to develop strategies for 
the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms to 
complement the building of the ASEAN Community” (emphasis added). 
While the following Articles mostly concerns promotion, here is clearly a 
broadly formulated mandate with potential protectional features. The 
indication of this mandate is to be further specified by the Commission but 
it opens a window to include whatever the Commission wants it to include 
as long as there is political will to back it up.  
 
Second, Article 4.10 states that the AICHR is mandated to “obtain 
information from ASEAN Member States on the promotion and protection 
of human rights.” What kind of information is not specified and could 
potentially be what the AICHR desires. The provision is significant in that it 
provides the AICHR with a mandate to request information of general or 
specific concern. This provision comes closely to what could be thought of 
as a “fact finding” mandate. Taking Myanmar as an example, such 
possibilities are much needed since the UNs performance in this area so far 
has been modest. However, it is likely that the norm of non-interference in 
the internal affair of Member States will be a hard one to side step when 
deciding upon such matters.250  
 
Third, and closely connected to Article 4.10, is Article 4.12 mandating the 
AICHR “to prepare studies on thematic issues of human rights in ASEAN”.  
Used together with Article 4.10 the thematic studies can be on anything the 
Commission desires and contain the information they decide to gather.251  
 
Finally, the above also provides an example of how the different Articles 
can be combined to further expand the mandates. Article 4.10 can for 
example be combined with Article 4.8 stating that AICHR shall “engage in 
dialogue and consultation with other ASEAN bodies and entities associated 
with ASEAN, including civil society […]” This opens up for a consultation 
with other stakeholders to determine the thematic issues in ASEAN. 
Combining Article 4.8 and Article 6.2 providing that “AICHR shall convene 
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two regular meetings per year” also gives room for other stakeholders to 
take part in the meetings.252  
 
6.1.3.2. The Mandates of the ACWC 
With a language mandating the body to “assisting”, “encouraging” and 
“promoting”, much like the AICHR, the ACWC mandates and functions are 
limited to mainly promote human rights. Similar to the AICHR ToR Article 
4.1, the ACWC ToR however also contain an Article, which mandates it to 
“develop policies, programs and innovative strategies to promote and 
protect the rights of women and children to complement the building of the 
ASEAN Community (Article 5.2) This Article opens up for interpretation to 
include wider promotional and protectional measures. 
 
Furthermore, the ToR to the ACWC is constructed with more specific 
mandates, especially when it comes to the implementation of human rights. 
While addressing human rights in legal text is one thing, implementing them 
by raising awareness, provide training, institutionalising behavioural change 
etc is another.253 On this issue, the ACWC is for example tasked with 
building capacities of relevant stakeholders at all levels e.g. administrative, 
legislative, judicial, civil society etc. through the provision of technical 
assistance, training and workshops, towards the realization of the rights of 
woman and children (Article 5.5). Another mandate is to assist in 
implementing the concluding observations of CEDAW and CRC and other 
treaty bodies related to the rights of women and children (Article 5.7). The 
ACWC also has stronger language in terms of addressing the root causes of 
human rights violations, with Article 5.12 mandating the ACWC “To 
propose and promote appropriate measures, mechanisms and strategies for 
the prevention and elimination of all forms of violations of the rights of 
women and children, including the protection of victims”. 
 
6.1.4. Inclusion of and Engagement with Civil Society in ASEAN 
and its Human Rights Process 
 
Another important issue is the possibility for civil society organisations 
(CSOs) to engage with the ASEAN human rights regime. CSOs have played 
an important role in bringing human rights and the human security discourse 
into ASEAN’s agenda.254 However, at present, ASEAN is still a very state 
centric organisation. The lack of inclusion of civil society and other 
stakeholders are visible in a few ways. First, ASEAN’s 1986 “Guidelines 
for ASEAN Relations with NGOs” state that “Approval of application for 
affiliation of an NGO with ASEAN shall be based primarily upon the 
assessment of the positive contribution which such an NGO could make to 
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the enhancement, strengthening and realisation of the aims and objectives of 
ASEAN.”255 Chapter V of the ASEAN Charter softened this approach 
somewhat, with article 16 stating that “ASEAN may engage with entities 
which support the ASEAN Charter, in particular its purposes and principles. 
The associated entities remain limited mainly to groups of a technical or 
business nature and there are extremely few organisations that work with 
human right issues.256 Second, CSOs roles are very limited in the work of 
the AICHR and the ACWC and it has not been possible, up to this point, to 
institutionalise civil society engagement with ASEAN, which is why the 
design of the Rules of Procedure that will be agreed on by AICHR and the 
ACWC are of high importance.  
 
There is thus a large possibility for ASEAN to engage with a wider selection 
of groups, including human rights NGOs, particularly as ASEAN seeks to 
fulfil its Charter commitment in Article 1.13 “To promote a people-oriented 
ASEAN in which all sectors of society are encouraged to participate in, and 
benefit from, the process of ASEAN integration and community building”. 
Article 4.8 of the AICHR ToR provides that AICHR must engage in 
dialogue with other ASEAN bodies, including CSOs and other stakeholders. 
Clearly, there is a demand for wider civil society participation, and the 
provisions create an opportunity for the commissioners to engage in a 
dialogue with different civil society groups, NGOs and other organisations. 
 
Closely connected to Article 4.8 is Article 4.9, which provides that the 
AICHR shall “consult, as may be appropriate, with other national, regional 
and international institutions and entities concerned with the promotion and 
protection of human rights”. The national human rights commissions of 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines are examples of such 
institutions that can be a way for the AICHR to gain more close information 
from individual countries on specific issues. The four national human rights 
commissions have also formed a network, which aims to develop collective 
strategies on issues such as human rights education (specifically for the 
military and the police); the rights of migrant workers; the rights of 
trafficked persons; anti-terrorism; and the promotion and protection of 
economic and social rights.257 A closer interaction with such sub-regional 
groupings can provide the AICHR with insight in both national and trans-
national human rights issues. 
 
The ToR to the ACWC is fairly silent on this issue, but Article 5.14 calls for 
the participation of women and children in dialogue and consultation 
processes related to the promotion and protection of women. 
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6.1.5. Ratification of Core International Human Rights 
Instruments by ASEAN Member States  
 
In the view of establishing a regional human rights regime and improving 
human rights standards, ratification of international human rights treaties is 
a critical factor,258 because it at least displays a prima facie acceptance to 
international human right norms. Of course, mere ratification is no 
guarantee for acceptance or implementation of international human right 
norms. According to Eldridge (2002), “Together with reservations and 
declarations against various treaties, it can shed light on states’ underlying 
outlook, idiosyncrasies and understanding of national interest in dealing 
with human right obligations”.259 Visible from Table 1.2 in chapter two was 
that many of the states still have not ratified some of the core treaties, and 
almost none have acceded to the Optional Protocols of different treaties. The 
ASEAN Charter reaffirms that the Member States must uphold “the United 
Nations Charter and international law, including international humanitarian 
law, subscribed to by ASEAN Member States.” (Article 2. (j)). Article 14.5 
of the AICHR ToR states that the body shall “encourage ASEAN Member 
States to consider acceding to ratifying international human rights 
instruments.” This is followed by Article 4.6, which calls for the AICHR to 
“promote the full implementation of ASEAN instruments related to human 
rights.”  Ratification and subsequent implementation of more international 
human right treaties will create a more uniform understanding and approach 
to human right norms among the ASEAN states. This will be especially 
important in the drafting of an ASEAN human rights instrument. 
 
According to the ACWC ToR, Women’s socio-cultural rights are to be 
realized by implementing already existing agreements, upgrading regional 
mechanism, and institutionalise gender statistics. Children’s rights are to be 
protected too by full implementation of the Convention on the rights of the 
Child (Articles 5.1 and 5.13). All ASEAN Member States have ratified the 
CEDAW and CRC. However, some of the states have substantive 
reservations to both of the treaties.260 While the ACWC focuses on the 
issues of protecting woman and children, this is an example how both 
commissions can complement each other and pursue important human rights 
issues together, educating and raising awareness of the CEDAW and CRC 
and the reservations. They can highlight certain problem areas and 
encourage a regional effort to withdraw those reservations, and create a 
uniform regional stance on protection for women and children.261  
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6.2. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The arguments and ideas put forward in this chapter have been rather 
speculative. There are different roles and functions that the ASEAN human 
right regime might perform, now and in the future. On the one hand, it is 
clear that the textual interpretation of some of the mandates enables for 
much wider possibilities for the ASEAN human rights regime when it 
comes to promotion and protection of human rights. Indeed, “ambiguity can 
be as much a friend as a foe when interpreting legal instruments”.262 On the 
other hand, reality reveals that such possibilities are very limited much 
because the political will in some of the Member States is very limited. 
Thus, for now it is likely that the commissions will serve primarily advisory, 
coordinating, and consultative bodies. Reviewing Surin Pitsuwans words in 
chapter one with regards to the scepticism against this new human rights 
framework, “a sense of reservation” against the ASEAN human rights 
regime thus seems justified. It is created yes, but what will the further 
development look like? 
 
“Beyond the obvious, which is that it is wonderful that they created the AICHR, it is hard to 
obviously see what they will be able to do in their current state” (Interview with Melinda 
MacDonald, Program Manager South East Asian Regional Cooperation in Human 
Development Project (SEARCH), Bangkok, Thailand). 
 
“Expectations need to be reasonable. You have to think about the countries in the world 
that are involved in this inter-governmental organisation. But the fact that countries like 
Thailand were able to even have incentives on human rights included in this agreement is 
really quite an accomplishment and it may, over time, provide a foothold for human rights 
to be considered juridically, particular in the context of economic development. But I think 
that’s a long term goal” (Interview with Ms. Erin Shaw, Regional Legal Advisor, Asia-
Pacific Programme, International Commission of Jurists, Bangkok, Thailand). 
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CHAPTER VII 
7. Assessing an ASEAN Human Rights Regime - 
Conclusion 
The purpose of this thesis has been to examine the prospects of the recently 
established ASEAN human rights regime to have an effective impact on 
human rights protection in its Member States. Undoubtedly, the process of 
establishing the ASEAN human rights regime has been with quite some 
unease and no one can deny that human rights issues and the realisation of a 
credible and effective ASEAN human rights regime are still very 
challenging matters for ASEAN. The difficulties have been due to a number 
of factors, some more prominent than others, and while institutions for the 
promotion and protection of human rights now undeniably exist, the 
ambivalent approach to human rights within ASEAN and its Member States 
has been reflected upon these institutions casting doubts as to whether 
human rights has emerged as a serious concern for ASEAN. This final 
chapter will closer examine and analyse some of these challenges and make 
some general conclusions on the way forward. 
 
7.1 MAIN CHALLENGES TO THE ASEAN HUMAN RIGHTS 
REGIME 
When examining challenges, as chapter one laid out, those can be 
fundamental challenges constituted mainly by resistance from Member 
States, or structural ambiguities within the system itself. Usually they tend 
to overlap somewhat since a general lack of political will in Member States 
will impact on all subsequent cooperation.  
 
7.1.1. Fundamental Challenges 
 
With regional order built on norms of non-interference and consensus and a 
perception that sovereignty of each state has been the condition for 
successful cooperation, it is obvious that the main challenge against 
establishing an effective ASEAN human rights regime still lies with the 
political will of the Member States to ASEAN. Thai Prime Minister Abhisit 
Vijjajiva acknowledged this fact by stating: “Ultimately, it is about the 
commitment of Member States to enhancing the quality of the life of 
ASEAN peoples, empowering and engaging them in ASEAN’s community 
building process, all of which form the fundamental basis of genuine 
community for peoples”.263 Without the will to implement and enforce 
democracy and human rights at the domestic level there is no reason to 
expect that promotion through the ASEAN Charter will enhance such 
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values, and even harder to see how such powers will be given to a regional 
human rights body.  
 
“When you get right down to it, it is only when you have a domestic enforcement 
mechanism that governments are forced to adhere to international standards and we are a 
long way from that in ASEAN” (Interview with Ms. Erin Shaw, Regional Legal Advisor, 
Asia-Pacific Programme, International Commission of Jurists, Bangkok, Thailand). 
 
Clearly, traditional perception of human rights, democracy and their 
limitation for economic development and stability still remain very strong in 
most ASEAN Member States. As a paradox, the ASEAN states have 
considered values of democracy, respect for the rule of law and protection 
and promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms important enough 
to include in the ASEAN Charter, indicating that such values may still be 
beneficial or even necessary for successful development of the state. Such 
undertakings, however, become somewhat eroded when one considers the 
situation in some of the Member States, and even more so bearing in mind 
the central objectives on which ASEAN was founded - to enhance economic 
development and sustain regional order. That a state like Myanmar was 
allowed to sign the ASEAN Charter despite the fact that the current 
situation in the country displays a policy of the government, which can be 
held to go against some of the core principles in the Charter, illustrates that 
unity and concerns for other issues than human rights are far more important 
within ASEAN.   
 
This leaves us with a few central questions; first, why ASEAN Member 
States even included concepts of democracy and human rights if they never 
intended to uphold and implement the Charter, and, second, if the 
establishment of the ASEAN human rights regime was ever intended to 
have any possibilities to improve human rights protection? In the 
establishment of the AICHR George Yeo, Singapore’s Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, conceded that “some countries preferred a body ‘which has no 
teeth’ because of the concern that Western countries and NGOs will make 
use of it to interfere in their domestic politics. However, other countries 
preferred a credible human rights body.”264  
 
The statement display that, as seen in chapter two, there seem to be a 
division within ASEAN between the two groups when it comes to human 
rights. The first one comprised of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and 
Thailand and the second one comprised of Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia, and 
Vietnam.265 Singapore and Brunei being somewhere in between. Issues on 
domestic political security concerns, internal circumstances, the discussion 
on the Asian values, the debate over an ASEAN human rights mechanism, 
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the principle of non-interference, and the ASEAN way have made the first 
group rethink traditional norms or even call for norm changes. Among the 
ten ASEAN members, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand 
currently have their own independent national human rights bodies. The 
NGOs networks, an important force behind any idea of human rights 
evolution, are also stronger in these four countries. The adherence to the rule 
of law is relatively better here than elsewhere in Southeast Asia. They also 
have a long history of cooperating with each other in many fields since they 
were all original members of ASEAN.266  
 
The second group tries to preserve the status quo, which could best serve 
their political interests.267 Democracy in these countries is far from 
consolidated and the institutions for protecting and promoting human rights 
are few. In this group concerns over the threats that human rights pose to 
sovereignty against the nation state still remain strong and constitutes the 
major stumbling block for human rights cooperation. That these countries 
had no interest in creating a strong human rights regime comes as no 
surprise. That they agreed to create a human rights regime at all, without 
teeth, might be considered no more than an action to reduce some pressure 
from other ASEAN states and appease the outside world.    
 
Human rights cooperation clearly holds greater promise between some of 
the ASEAN Member States. Phan (2009) for example argues for a selective 
approach to human rights, rather than inclusive, where this sub-regional 
group with better human rights records and stronger political will that may 
have conditions to establish a more effective human rights mechanism goes 
ahead and do so.268 One might even go further and humbly propose, with the 
risk of being laughed at, that an effective and credible human rights regime 
would require some fundamental prerequisites in terms of level of 
democratisation, adherence to the rule of law and protection of human 
rights, as a condition for membership.269 In this regard, valuable lessons can 
certainly be learned by examining other regional human right regimes. 
Because it is essentially here, at the birth of human rights cooperation, that 
such necessary elements would play a vital role for an effective and credible 
human rights regime. With such requirements, states with better human 
rights record can put pressure on states with poor human rights record to 
improve themselves. Furthermore, such requirements would also signal to 
states who are already members of the human rights regime that they 
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continuously need to meet the requirements or otherwise running the risk of 
being excluded from the co-operation. In that way the regime would begin 
to assure accountability, not only at the national level but also at the 
regional level. It would also give more weight to the principles in the 
ASEAN Charter. 
 
The reality, however, is that excluding ASEAN Member States from 
regional human rights cooperation was never an option since such an 
arrangement could disrupt the regional order. “A human rights body for 
ASEAN should go ahead with all 10 members of the group including 
Myanmar” experts held in the meetings preceding the drafting of the Terms 
of Reference to the AICHR.270 Clearly, a regime must be based on common 
interests and shared values, and represents a politically acceptable solution 
to a collective problem. Here lies the major difficulty for the development of 
this human rights regime and its credibility to the outside world. It contains 
too many states with poor democracy and human rights practices and with 
little interest in human rights cooperation. It is created within a regional 
framework that seeks to uphold old norms that with current practices are 
incompatible with the new norms they are trying to promote. In such 
context, the ASEAN Charter is, as Jones (2008) puts it, “worryingly 
ambivalent”.271 The reality is thus that the ASEAN human rights regime 
includes ten members which, for the moment, all have to agree to advance 
human rights cooperation in the region.  
 
7.1.2. Ambiguities within the Regime 
 
While it is undisputed that a human rights regime established within the 
framework of ASEAN is a step in the right direction, the framework can be 
considered a great ambiguity in itself. These ambiguities are really no more 
than an extension of the Member States lack of political will to create an 
effective human rights regime and enforced  by the fact that ASEAN is an 
extremely politicized organisation.272 However, identifying certain 
weaknesses as well as strengths makes it easier to pin point what changes 
can possibly be made. 
 
First, the ambiguities in the language of the instruments clearly illustrates 
that there is ambivalence towards human rights. Like with all other ASEAN 
bodies, the principles of consultation and consensus, with firm respect for 
sovereign equality of all member states permeates the AICHR and the 
ACWC. This implies that the action of any of these Commissions initially 
requires the agreement of each country’s representative and secondly a 
consensus by the Member States. Since countries with the lowest human 
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rights standards can use their veto power, human rights advancement may 
be compromised. The principle of non-interference is not something unique 
to ASEAN but rather a universally excepted norm under international law. 
However, when it comes to human rights ASEAN Members particularly 
regards it as a domestic concern and can use the principle to avoid scrutiny 
of their human rights performance. The lack of a clear enforcement 
mechanism and dispute settlement procedure in the ASEAN Charter makes 
it difficult to deal with members’ whose actions goes against the principles 
of the Charter in the first place. 
 
Second, the lack of independence of the commissions might be the most 
pressing issue for their effectiveness. 
 
“The most important one is that the members of the commission need to be independent. 
Only Indonesia and Thailand appointed independent experts into the commissions. Then 
the rest of the countries have appointed either government officials or former civil servants 
of the government. This is going to compromise the work of the commission and how 
effective it is going to be. If the commission is not able to be critical about government 
positions then the commission will become more like a mouthpiece for the government 
rather than a institution that will promote and protect human rights” (Interview with Mr. 
Yap Swee Seng, Executive Director, Forum Asia, Bangkok, Thailand). 
 
“You need some kind of independence. If you look at international principles on the 
protection and promotion of human rights and the constitution of institutions charged with 
these tasks, it is crucial that the people who sit on these bodies serve in their personal 
capacities, that they have a defined, relatively stable tenure, and that they are independent 
from their governments. In the case of Burma, Vietnam and Cambodia I can’t see how that 
could possibly happen” (Interview with Ms. Erin Shaw, Regional Legal Advisor, Asia-
Pacific Programme, International Commission of Jurists, Bangkok, Thailand). 
 
While it is important that the commissions comprises of experts competent 
in the field of human rights, it is equally important that the representatives 
are able to act independently and propose suitable recommendations. Thus, 
the effectiveness of the commissions depends largely on the composition of 
the commissions on the one hand, and the ability of the representatives to 
act independently on the other. While representatives can be selected 
through national process of selection, eight of the ten representatives are 
currently government appointees. Only Thailand and Indonesia are 
represented by non-government members. Furthermore, all the 
representatives are accountable directly to their governments.  
 
Third, the broad and weak mandates of the commissions pose challenges 
both in terms of effective implementation of human rights standards but also 
in terms of interpretation of the mandates. Especially the absence of a 
complaints mechanism can be considered the most obvious fallacy when it 
comes to the possibility of the ASEAN human rights regime to effectively 
protect human rights. Without a individual complaint mechanism, the 
system lacks one of the essential features of a human rights regime with 
regards to meeting the fundamental requirements in a democratic society 
and adheres to international human rights standards – that is, that those who 
have had their rights violated have the chance to participate, and that those 
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who have committed transgressions should be held accountable to their 
citizens for their acts.   
  
Fourth, the above is also closely related to the fact that the possibility for 
civil society to engage is still very limited. Right now, most of the meetings 
are closed and there is very little consultation on different issues that 
involves civil society. This reflects that ASEAN and its human rights 
commissions are still too state-centric institutions.  
 
Finally, the resources provided to the ASEAN human rights regime have not 
been sufficient. Without adequate funding, little matters how effective the 
regime is could potentially be. Without sufficient funding the regime has no 
prospects of functioning effectively. 
 
7.2. THE WAY FORWARD 
7.2.1. Member States, the Commissions and Civil Society 
 
Indeed, the possibilities of the ASEAN human rights regime to have any 
effective impact on human rights will depend on what it can do (with 
regards to the actual mandates vested in the commissions), but also on what 
it is willing to do. The further development of a credible and effective 
regional human rights mechanism will take time and requires support on 
several levels.273 Essentially, to overcome the challenges and to develop 
effective mechanisms for the promotion and protection of human rights, the 
ASEAN human rights regime requires the political will of the Member 
States, the initiative of the representatives on the commissions and the 
engagement of civil society.274  
 
All challenges for the ASEAN human rights regime are underpinned by the 
political will of the Member States of ASEAN. In order to allow for an 
effective and credible human rights regime to develop the states must adhere 
to the principles enshrined in the ASEAN Charter and the ToRs without 
using the ambiguities to their own advantage. First, when it comes to 
ASEAN the Member States must allow it to change with the new 
developing framework. In fact, one can argue that the Association is already 
deviating from some of the traditional norms with the inclusion of human 
right norm in the ASEAN Charter and the establishment of the human rights 
regime. But the process is very slow. In this development, ASEAN needs to 
open up to its people, and also to external actors, to offer something more 
than just a solution between ten Member States to promote economic 
growth and stability. This is important in order to make the human rights 
framework more relevant and credible. An important factor in the 
reformation of ASEAN, one that is not often mentioned, is the Secretary 
General. Much like the Secretary General within the UN, the Secretary 
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General of ASEAN is the face and spokesperson of the Association. The 
Secretary General can be requested to provide good offices, conciliation or 
mediation in a dispute.275 Being the face outwards he has the possibility to 
advocate for human rights and to make it a more important concern on 
ASEAN’s agenda. The current Secretary General, Surin Pitsuwan showed 
some good will by attending the First International Conference on Human 
Rights in Southeast Asia where he shared his views. Second, the Member 
States must endow the commissions with the necessary means to truly fulfil 
their mandates. At the first stage, this includes making the representatives 
on the commissions independent. It also includes engaging and consulting 
all sections of civil society in the selection process of the representatives and 
other decision-making processes. Third, when it comes to human rights in 
general the state must ratify all core international human right treaties 
including their optional protocols.  
 
The initiatives of the representatives to the commissions must also be 
activated. This includes interpreting and making use of the “broad” 
mandates in the widest possible sense and while at the same time maintain 
the independence from political interference of the Member States and 
ASEAN. Some of the mandates, as shown above, opens up for a wide 
interpretation that makes it possible to develop at least stronger monitoring 
mechanisms. Furthermore, independence is of course especially important 
in the development of common standards of human rights (especially 
through the drafting of the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration) that does 
not go below international UN standards enshrined in the UDHR and other 
instruments. It also includes opening up and creating a structure for dialogue 
and engagement with civil society at the regional level through human rights 
organisations, and at national level through organisations, academic 
institutions NHRIs and the general public.  
 
Without any doubt, the process must be undertaken with a high level of 
engagement of civil society, human rights organisations and NHRIs, since it 
is civil society that provides the so called “check and balances” ensuring 
that the work of the commissions is effective.276 The work of ASEAN has 
hardly ever been monitored or evaluated by its people. Without any 
accountability, the undertakings by ASEAN and its human rights regime it 
runs the risk of being no more than empty words. A priority from the 
commissions at this stage should be to raise people’s awareness of their 
existence as well as human rights in general. In this work, representatives 
from civil society have an important role to play and can engage with the 
commissions through research, lobbying and education. They can assist the 
commissions by providing expertise on specific issues and “on the ground” 
experience to enhance the research capacity. Civil society representatives 
can also lobby member states to empower the commissions to enhance its 
protective mandate.  
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7.3 SOME FINAL WORDS  
7.3.1 A New Dawn for Human Rights in Southeast Asia? 
 
While criticism against ASEAN and its human rights practices lies close at 
hand, it is also easy to forget the positive progress and implications. Going 
back to chapter one, we may indeed ask ourselves what other mechanism 
would have been possible at this stage?277  The ASEAN human rights 
regime may rate poorly against international standards, but the fact that all 
ten ASEAN governments have agreed to establish even the most 
rudimentary of human rights commissions is more progress than many 
would have expected only a few years ago. A human rights regime would 
never have been realised in the first place without the consensus of all 
ASEAN Member States. That a country like Myanmar now at least 
officially talk and interact in a human rights dialogue must be considered a 
distinct step forward. Moreover, despite that the ASEAN human rights 
regime has limited authority to ensure that Member States comply with 
human rights norms, its very existence together with possible functions such 
as issuance of statements and findings has the potential to serve as a catalyst 
to greater reform.  
 
At the same time, the central concern still remain, whether these bodies will 
be robust to do what they can or merely become servant of regimes that are 
much unfriendly to human rights?  One author made the following comment 
with regards to the next important step for the AICHR, the drafting of an 
ASEAN Declaration on Human Rights, but the words can however be 
applied to the ASEAN human rights regime in large: 
 
“[…] the only thing worse than having no regional human rights instruments at all is having 
one riddled with restrictions, caveats, provisos and balancing acts, and it is not difficult to 
imagine such a document emerging from ASEAN, if some of its member states have it their 
way. However, there are strong enough, and certainly dedicated enough, forces within 
ASEAN working in the opposite direction for that dread to be justifiably tempered by a 
healthy dosage of hope.”278 
 
Is it maybe so, that a too weak human rights regime is worse than having no 
regime at all? Certainly, such cooperation can be misused by states to 
advance other interests than human rights. Moreover a too weak framework 
will lack relevance and credibility, and, if it fails, perhaps become a serious 
obstacle to any future human rights cooperation with little interest to support 
by the outside world. Creating a human rights regime just for the sake of 
creating one, without any real intentions to empower it with the necessary 
tools for it to be able to perform any relevant work, seem meaningless. 
However, as was shown in chapter four, all human right regimes have 
undergone transformation and gradually developed, some from being 
merely declaratory or promotional to becoming implementation and 
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enforcement regimes.279 A weak international human rights regime may 
contribute to improve national practice, gradually developing consensus and 
mutual understanding of norms among its members. It has the potential to 
convince states, even the worst, to gradually accept regime norms and 
procedures, especially norms that do not appear immediately threatening. 
Even if it is not likely that ASEAN will in the nearest construct a system of 
intervening in each other’s affairs based on human rights, the ASEAN 
human rights regime can, for the time being, focus on specific human rights 
concerns that all can agree upon and try to elaborate a more common stance 
on human rights norms.  
 
Indeed, much progress is needed for the ASEAN human rights regime to be 
able to effectively promote and protect human rights within the region. 
While the ASEAN Charter and the ToRs to the AICHR and the ACWC 
marks a step forward towards realisation of human rights, without serious 
dedication that begins with the Member States, a serious risk is that this 
human rights regime will stagnate and become irrelevant. The challenges 
are many and the first few years will reveal if the Member States are serious 
about their human rights undertakings. For the question if the new ASEAN 
human rights regime marks a new dawn in Southeast Asia, the answer is, 
hopefully at worst, and maybe possibly at best. The development of credible 
and effective regional human rights mechanisms does take time, and the 
way toward this end is never an easy one.  
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